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vAbstract
I present three political science examples of observational studies where modern causal
inferences techniques are used to improve upon previous estimates. Difference-in-
differences, fixed effects estimators, and a propensity score matching model are used to
demonstrate model dependence in previous studies of the impact of voting technology
on residual vote rates. Measuring the incumbency advantage serves as an example
of when the assumptions of matching methods fail, and given the data, a linear
model is most appropriate. The impact of voter identification on turnout is properly
modeled in two ways: first, a multilevel logistic regression is used to appropriately
model how state and individual covariates, and their interactions, affect the decision
to participate; second, a Bayesian shrinkage estimator is used to properly model the
ordinal nature of the voter identification treatment variable. In each essay, the benefit
of using causal inference techniques to more efficiently estimate quantities of interest
in questions of political representation and policy outcomes is demonstrated.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contains three essays that were written independently, but that contain
overlapping themes and ideas. As indicated by the title, all three essays concern ques-
tions of political representation and the causal inference techniques that can be used to
measure these quantities of interest. In the first essay, difference-in-differences, fixed
effects estimators, and a propensity score matching model are used to demonstrate
model dependence in previous studies of the impact of voting technology on residual
vote rates. In the second essay, measuring the incumbency advantage serves as an ex-
ample of when the assumptions of matching methods fail, and given the data, a linear
model is most appropriate. In the final chapter, the impact of voter identification on
turnout is properly modeled in two ways: first, a multilevel logistic regression is used
to appropriately model how state and individual covariates, and their interactions,
affect the decision to participate; second, a Bayesian shrinkage estimator is used to
properly model the ordinal nature of the voter identification treatment variable. In
each essay, the benefit of using causal inference techniques to more efficiently estimate
quantities of interest in questions of political representation and policy outcomes is
demonstrated.
The first essay asks whether the method used to cast and count ballots affects
the quality of preference recording in the voting booth. Quality is measured with
the residual vote rate, which is calculated using county level data for the presidential
elections in 1988–2004. Difference-in-differences, fixed effects models and propensity
score matching methods are used to isolate attributable effects to technology. Punch
2cards consistent perform the worst, but the ranking of other technologies is model
dependent. The magnitude of the effects varies across estimation methods as well.
The second essay notes that the problem of measuring the incumbency advantage
is really a missing data problem. Given this, the essay asks whether matching methods
can be utilized to avoid linear model dependency. The data used are election returns,
incumbency status, and party identification from the 1898–2002 U.S. congressional
elections. The model of Gelman-King (1990) is extended to include more information
about previous vote shares in each district, and then a propensity score matching
model is used to try and isolate the average gain in vote share to incumbents. The
results show that the classical linear model produces the most reliable estimates of the
incumbency advantage. In addition, the essay demonstrates that if the propensity
score used for matching is not a good estimate of the true propensity score, then
matching results are essentially based on random samples of the data and are not
reliable.
The third essay concerns the impact of voter identification on turnout, particu-
larly in subpopulations such as the elderly, the lower educated, and racial minorities.
Voter identification requirements are measured at the state level and are ordinal.
The data utilized are individual responses to the Current Population Survey Voter
Supplement in 2000 and 2004. Two models are estimated. First, a multilevel logistic
regression with interactions attempts to uncover the impact of voter identification on
subpopulations. Second, a Bayesian shrinkage estimator is used to properly model the
ordinal nature of the voter identification variable and to suggest that conventional
constrained models are insufficient. The results show that conditional on registra-
tion, voter identification requirements have little to no effect on voter turnout, even
within important subpopulations. In addition, modeling choice of the ordinal variable
matters, as does proper modeling of the state and nationwide trends in turnout.
All three essays relate to consequences for political representation. The first and
second essays concern consequences of representation at the ballot box—as the qual-
ity of preference recording in casting ballots can affect the choice of elector, and an
incumbency advantage may insure an elector with preferences that are not repre-
3sentative of his/her consituents is chosen. Both the first and third essay address the
principle of “one person, one vote”—as subpopulations may be disenfranchised by un-
equal ability to operate technologies, non-uniform enforcement of voter identification
laws, or a heftier burden of the tax of acquiring identification.
Unlike much of the data in other sciences, experiments are rare in political sci-
ence and field experiments are only seldom implementable. As observational data is
most often available, and in addition political science data is often messy and sparse,
inference can be tricky. There continues to be a gap in the literature between the
theoretical properties of causal inference techniques and the practical applications of
them. It is shown clearly that regression adjustment and matching methods together
reduce bias, and reducing heterogeneity leads to more efficient estimates. But in
practice, unobservable covariates often exist and finding the “true” propensity score
can be a difficult task. In addition, often the reduction of heterogeneity leads to a
very small sample and reduced direction of inference. In addition, political scientists
are faced with a tradeoff between answering important policy questions and choosing
models that fit the data best. Given all this, it is still arguable that causal inference
techniques should be used whenever possible. It is extremely important, however,
that researchers are aware of all the assumptions—explicit and implicit—made by
the theoretical models they employ and that they thoroughly evaluate the reasonable
nature of the assumptions for their practical problem.
4Chapter 2
Model dependency and measuring
the effect of voting technology on
residual votes
After the 2000 election, political scientists became increasingly interested in measur-
ing the extent to which different voting technologies impact residual vote rates in
the United States. The question in which I am interested is how robust these mea-
surements are to the choice of specification and estimation technique. Most of the
previous research has conducted multivariate regression analysis on cross-sectional
data, with the exception of a few regionally concentrated panel studies.1 Brady et al.
(2001) evaluate performance of technologies in U.S. counties in the 2000 presidential
election. Using data from the 1996 election, Knack and Kropf (2003) find a positive
relationship between voided ballots and the percentage of African Americans in the
county, specifically in counties with voting equipment that allow overvotes. Kimball
et al. (2004) utilize a generalized least squares approach to estimate the number
of unrecorded votes in the 2000 election. Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) advance
the methodology considerably by estimating a fixed effects model on a pooled time-
series data set, consisting of data from the 1988–2000 presidential, gubernatorial, and
senatorial election returns in U.S. counties.
This analysis begins with a replication of Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005) with
an additional panel of data. To investigate the degree of model dependence in their
results, the analysis is replicated using several different causal estimators. Specifically,
5using data from the 1988–2004 presidential elections, the effect of voting technology
on residual vote rates is analyzed via several econometric estimators. A difference-
in-differences estimator is used estimate the effect on an average county of switching
from punch cards to optically scanned ballots for each election cycle. Fixed effects
regression models provide a generalization of the difference-in-differences approach,
estimating the effect of changing technology on residual vote rates within counties over
time, for each type of voting equipment currently in use in the U.S. Both difference-
in-differences and fixed effects models attempt to isolate the effect of a technology
change on residual votes by controlling for confounding factors that are unobservable
and are fixed, or at least slowly changing over time. In contrast, the propensity
score matching method applied here generates a balanced data set by conditioning
on observable confounders; several estimators are then applied to this data set—a
simple differences estimator and a parametric regression.
The pattern of the results is not robust to the different methods. Applying the
parametric estimators to the raw data indicates that paper ballots and lever machines
produce the lowest rates of residual votes, followed by optically scanned ballots, direct
recording electronic machines, and punch cards. After producing matched samples
and repeating the analysis, electronic machines, optical scanners and paper ballots
are proven the superior technologies (followed by lever machines). Punch cards are
universally represented as the poorest choice in terms of residual votes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 defines the
different technologies and discusses various ways residual votes can occur. Section 2.2
addresses the problem of estimating treatment effects. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe
the data and methods used. I report results of the analyses in Section 2.5. Section
2.6 further explores the results by looking more in depth at 2004 election data and
provides directions for future research.
62.1 Voting technology and residual votes
The residual vote rate is defined as the fraction of total ballots cast for which no vote
for president was counted (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2001). Residual
votes can occur when a vote is cast for more than one candidate in a single race, when
a single vote is marked in a way that is uncountable, or when the ballot is left blank.
In the voting literature, other terms used to refer the difference between ballots cast
and votes counted are “over votes,” “under votes,” “spoiled ballots,” “drop off,” “roll
off,” “voter fatigue,” or the “error rate” (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project,
2001). In this paper, the term residual vote is used because it encompasses each of
these cases—error on the part of the voter, mechanical or technological failure of the
voting equipment, and abstention.
Abstention is the most obvious way that the number of ballots cast might differ
from the number of votes counted for president, but there are other factors that might
affect the variance in residual vote rates across counties and election years.2 The
primary focus of this paper is on how to measure the causal effect of different voting
technologies on the rate of residual votes in an average county. There are five general
types of technologies in use in the United States represented in the data: hand-
counted paper ballots, mechanical lever machines, punch cards, optically-scanned
paper ballots, and direct recording electronic machines (DREs).3
The technologies used to record a voter’s preferences may affect the residual vote
because of mechanical (or other) failures. Paper ballots generally only “fail” when a
precinct runs out of ballots. Of course, human counting errors can also cause paper
ballots to “fail.” All other machine types can break down, which presents a serious
problem if the break down is not caught. Optically-scanned ballots can be treated
as paper ballots, if the officials are alerted to the malfunction in the scanner. The
counters, whether external and mechanical, or internal and electronic, on lever and
DRE machines may malfunction without being caught—leaving no way to recover lost
ballots. Punch cards are now famous for their failures—the “pregnant and hanging
chads” of Palm Beach County, FL, in the 2000 election are examples of failures of the
7punch card system to perform mechanically (Ansolabehere and Stewart, 2005).
There are, however, many county-specific factors that affect the ability of a voter
to cast a vote and have it counted that are independent of the voting technology. If
not controlled for properly, these may confound the estimated effect different tech-
nologies have on residual votes.4 Voter-specific characteristics, such as literacy and
English-language proficiency, may affect a voter’s ability to complete a ballot, as
might physical impairments such as arthritis or poor eyesight. The county’s size in
terms of population and wealth impact finances available for the adminstration of
elections, and in turn, affect the level of quality of trained poll workers available to
assist voters on election day, and the number of qualified workers on hand to count
ballots at the end of the day. The presence of a particularly salient issue or promi-
nent race on the ballot may bring voters to the polls that might not usually vote, or
a county may have a higher than average number of young people participating in
their first election—both could affect the rate of residual votes in a particular county
or election year. Finally, the introduction of a new technology may affect residual
votes, although it is not immediately clear in what direction. Voters may be confused
with the new machinery and therefore make more mistakes, or election officials may
anticipate these problems and increase educational efforts both before and during the
election, countering the effect and possibly lowering the residual vote rate.
2.2 Estimating treatment effects
The literature on the effect of voting technology on residual votes is filled with in-
teresting counterfactual questions. For example, Wand et al. (2001) find that in the
2000 presidential election, more than 2,000 Democratic voters in Palm Beach County
voted for Pat Buchanan by mistake because of the use of the “butterfly ballot.” An-
solabehere and Stewart (2005) claim that if all jurisdictions in the United States that
used punch cards in the 2000 presidential elections had instead used optical scanners,
approximately 500,000 more votes would have been counted in presidential election
returns nationwide. Fundamentally, these research questions are concerned with is-
8sues of cause and effect—in an average county, what percentage change in residual
votes can be expected if a change is made from voting technology X to voting technol-
ogy Y? But evaluating the impact of a policy change on individual (or county-level)
behavior is extremely difficult, as evidenced by the following simple example (adopted
from Duflo, 2002).
Suppose we are in a simpler situation where there are only two voting technologies
available, punch cards and optical scan machines. And suppose that it is not possible
to have a mixed technology county. Let Y OSi represent the residual vote rate in a
given county i if the county uses optical scanners, and Y Pi represent the residual vote
rate in the same county i if the county uses punch cards. The quantity of interest is
the difference Y OSi − Y Pi , the effect of using optical scanners relative to using punch
cards in county i. But the inherent problem is that we will never have a county i with
all ballots counted by optical scan machines and with all ballots cast on punch cards
simultaneously. We can only hope to infer the expected treatment effect, E[Y OSi −Y Pi ].
Now, imagine that we have collected data on a large number of counties in the
United States. Some of these counties use optical scanners, while the others use
punch cards. We can calculate the average residual vote in counties with optical
scanners and the average residual vote in counties using punch cards, and then take
the difference between the two averages. This can be represented as:
Difference = E[Y OSi |county uses optical scan] − E[Y Pi |county uses punch cards] =
E[Y OSi |OS]− E[Y Pi |P].
But this is potentially a biased estimate of the expected treatment effect. If Y Pi
differs systematically between counties in group OS and counties in group P, then
Y Pi is estimated incorrectly for the treated group (OS), because we only observe Y
P
i
for the control group (P).
Moving from this example to the real world, we have not two technologies, but
five. And it is indeed possible to have mixed technology counties. How are we to learn
the average effect of using another technology, such as paper ballots, relative to punch
cards in U.S. counties? Ideally, we would be in a situation where we could conduct an
9experiment, controlling the assignment of treatment to subjects and thereby ensuring
that subjects who receive different treatments are comparable (Rosenbaum, 2002).
Because laboratory experiments are often not feasible in political science, Green and
Gerber (2002) argue field experiments should be employed, when possible, to answer
questions of causality. However, in our particular example, even field experiments are
not feasible. Even if we could convince a sampling of counties to allow us to randomly
assign which voting technology they will use in the next presidential election, voting
equipment is extremely expensive and the sheer cost of implementation would be
enough to prohibit an experiment. Thus, we find ourselves in the world of observa-
tional studies (Cochran, 1965). As in any observational study, modeling assumptions
must be made in order to identify causal effects. As policy decisions are made based
on the outcome of such studies, it is often useful to examine the assumptions made
and compare the outcome under each set of assumptions.
2.3 Data
Because the decision of which voting technology to use in elections is generally made
at the county level, the unit of analysis is a (county, year) pair. To calculate the
residual vote rate in U.S. elections, I obtained data that recorded the total number
of ballots and the number of presidential votes cast in the 1988–2004 presidential
elections in each county in the sample.5 Also noted is whether another prominent
race is on the ballot in that observation, such as governor or U.S. senator. Data
from 1988 to 1996 were obtained from Election Data Services (EDS), for 2000 and
2004 from local election officials, and additional 2004 data from the Atlas of U.S.
Presidential Elections (Leip 2004).
Data on the voting equipment used in each of the counties was assembled for 1988
to 1996 from EDS, for 2000 from local election officials, and 2004 data from both EDS
and the Verified Voting Organization. The focus of this paper is on the five general
types of technologies, without making distinctions within the types. This is relaxed
in Section 2.6. There are some counties without a uniform voting technology. These
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are referred to in the paper as “mixed” technology counties. Such counties occur
most often in the New England states, where the municipal governments administer
elections. Over the course of this sample, counties increased their usage of optical
scanners and DREs, decreasing their use of the older machine types. Figure 2.1 plots
the distribution of voting technology types across counties and across the percent of
the voting population covered by each technology type in 1988–2004.
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Figure 2.1: Usage of Voting Technologies in the 1988–2004 Presidential Elections
A map depicting the distribution of machine types across the United States in the
2000 elections can be found in Figure 2.2, while Figure 2.3 presents the distribution
of machine types in 2004. Paper ballots are most used in the Midwestern states; New
York and Louisiana are the main states still using lever machines. The Southeast
and Western United States show a preference for the electronic machines, with punch
cards interspersed throughout the regions. Optical scanners are the most widely used
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technology, covering 40% of the population. Some states, such as Arizona, Georgia,
Maryland and New York use one technology only, whereas others, such as Arkansas,
Colorado, North Carolina and West Virginia have no single dominant technology.
Comparing the two maps reveals the large scale changes in Georgia and Nevada after
the 2000 elections.
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Figure 2.2: Voting Technology Usage in the 2000 Presidential Election
In addition to election returns and voting technology data, I obtained estimates
of county population by race and age and median income for each year in the sample
from the U.S. Census Bureau. Income was inflated to represent 2000 dollars using a
multiplier from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Data was acquired for approximately one-half of the 3,155 counties in the United
States over five presidential elections, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. Over the
course of the sample, several states were excluded in their entirety because they do
not require counties to report turnout separately from the number of votes cast for
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Figure 2.3: Voting Technology Usage in the 2004 Presidential Election
president. This is of great concern if states that do not report total ballots cast dif-
fer systematically in their relationship between voting technologies and residual vote
rates. Lacking a theoretical model of how the relative performance of voting equip-
ment to residual votes would differ in these states that do not require the reporting
of turnout, this concern cannot be directly addressed.
States with mixed-technology counties are excluded from the sample. Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont administer elections at the town level for many of the
years in our sample and Alaska administers elections at the State House district level.
These were excluded to maintain a constant unit of analysis. Finally, some observa-
tions were selectively excluded from the data due to strong suspicions of typographical
errors made when election returns were recorded.6 The total cases included in the
sample can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Residual vote rates in U.S. counties, averaged over the entire time frame, range
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from 1.9% (lever machines) to 2.9% (punch cards). When viewed as a percent of all
ballots cast nationwide, the lowest average residual vote is 1.5% (optical scanners) and
the highest is once again punch cards, with 2.5%. Residual vote rates have decreased
substantially over time for both optical scanners and DREs. Punch cards perform
worse than any other technology in 2000 and 2004, while DREs present higher residual
vote rates than other technology types from 1988–1996, regardless of whether the unit
of analysis is U.S. counties or U.S. voters.
2.4 Methods
When a county changes its voting technology, a natural experiment occurs. One
way to exploit this natural experiment is to simply estimate the difference in mean
residual vote rates before and after the change in technology. The problem with
this approach is that is impossible to distinguish changes in residual votes due to
the technological switch and changes due to other factors. These changes may be
due to demographic changes, a particularly competitive election, or any number of
observable or unobservable factors.
2.4.1 Difference-in-differences
The idea behind difference-in-differences is that we can improve on the method of
simple differences in means by subtracting out the differences in means of a control
group. In the context of this data, there is one (treatment, control) pair of technologies
for which there is sufficient N over all time periods that it makes sense to produce
difference-in-differences estimates: optically scanned ballots and punch cards. The
average change in residual vote rates when a county changes from punch cards to
optical scan machines is estimated for each of four time periods: 1988–1992, 1992–
1996, 1996–2000, and 2000–2004. Operationally, this is done by running least squares
regression on the following equation:
log(F(Yit)) = α+ β · 1{p = 1}+ γ · 1{i ∈ OS}+ η · 1{p = 1} · 1{i ∈ OS}+ εit (2.1)
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where Yit represents the residual vote rate in county i at time t; F(·) is a function used
to transform the dependent variable, to be discussed in detail below; α is a constant;
1{p = 1} is a dummy variable equal to unity if the observation is in the latter half of
the period (i.e., for the 1988–1992 period, p=1 in 1992); and 1{i ∈ OS} is a dummy
variable with a value equal to unity indicating that the observation belongs to the
treatment group (counties that switch to optical scanners). The OLS estimate of η is
numerically identical to the difference-in-differences estimate, DD.
The distribution of residual vote rates is skewed to the right and a transformation
is necessary to maintain the normality assumption in the least squares specification.
A commonly used transformation for variables with a skewed distribution is the log
transformation. However, it is also the case that the distribution of residual vote
rates, Yit, has a mass at zero, which is problematic for the log transformation. To
avoid dropping all of the zero residual vote observations, the following transformation
was utilized: F = 0.005 + 0.99 ∗ Yit (Fox, 1997, 59–81). The transformation function
F maps residual votes from the [0, 1] interval into the [0.005, 0.995] interval. To sen-
sibly interpret the estimated coefficients, βi, we must “back-transform” the estimates
from the log transformation, using the formula: τ(βˆi) = 100[exp(βˆi − ˆV ar(βˆi)2 ) − 1]
(Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980, and Kennedy, 1981). Standard errors are calclulated
using an approximate variance formula, ˆV ar(τ(βˆi)) = 100
2 exp(2βˆi)[exp(− ˆV ar(βˆi))−
exp(−2 ˆV ar(βˆi))] (van Garderen and Shat, 2002). Additionally, all observations are
weighted by turnout, so the interpretation of the dependent variable is relative to the
total number of votes cast.
2.4.2 Fixed effects models
Fixed effects regression generalizes the difference-in-differences approach to include
more than two time periods and more than one treatment group.7 The average change
in residual vote rates that occurs when a county changes voting technology is esti-
mated with several parametric specifications. All of the specifications are variations
on the following equation:
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log(F(Yit)) = αi + γt + T jitλj +Xitβ + εit (2.2)
where Yit is the residual vote rate of county i in year t; F(·) is a transformation of the
dependent variable, discussed above; αi are state or county fixed effects, depending
on the particular specification; γt are year fixed effects; T
j
it are binary variables equal
to unity if county i uses voting technology j in year t; and Xit is a vector of obser-
vation specific attributes acting as controls. Variables that appear in Xit are: log
of turnout, an indicator variable denoting whether there was a change in technology
since the last presidential election, an indicator variable denoting whether there is
a concurrent gubernatorial or senatorial election on the ballot, racial breakdown of
the population in percentage terms, percent of the population aged 18–24, percent
of the population 65 and older, median income and median income, squared.8 In all
estimation procedures, punch cards are treated as the “control” group. Again, all
observations are weighted by turnout.
In the first model, αi are state fixed effects. Consequently, a larger number of
county-specific control variables are included in Xit for this model. In addition to
state and year fixed effects, the first model includes all possible variables in the
vector Xit. In the next model, αi are county fixed effects. The control variables are
an indicator for the presence of another prominent race on the ballot, an indicator
variable denoting whether the county experienced a shift in technology, and the log of
turnout. All models are estimated by fixed effects regression on an unbalanced panel,
in which the unit of analysis is a (county, year) pair.9
2.4.3 Propensity score matching model
Rather than controlling for unobservable variables that are fixed across groups or
time, the propensity score matching methods developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) attempt to overcome the problem of discerning treatment effects in observa-
tional studies by explicitly conditioning on observables. The problem in identifying
treatment effects is essentially a missing data problem—the treatment group is ob-
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served and the outcome conditional on treatment assignment is observed, but the
counterfactual is not observed.
The problem with comparing average effects in observational studies is that typ-
ically treated units differ systematically from control units. Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) define treatment assignment to be strongly ignorable if we can find a vector of
covariates, X, such that
Y 1, Y 0 ⊥ T | X, 0 < pr(T = 1 | X) < 1.
That is, the outcomes under the treatment and the control Y 1 and Y 0 are independent
of the treatment assignment, T , conditional on observable covariates, X and that
there is overlap in the treatment probability. Intuitively, this says that conditional
on observables, the treatment assignment is random and that there is some non-zero
probability of each subject receiving the treatment or control.
Typically X is multidimensional and often contains continuous variables, making
exact matching highly impractical. However, a result due to Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) demonstrates that it is enough to condition on the propensity score, p(X) =
pr(T = 1|X). The true propensity score is not known, but is estimated via logistic
regression of Tit on a constant term and Xit, without regard to the dependent variable
Yit. In the context of this particular data, T
0
it is punch card machines, whereas the
treatment group is one of the other equipment types, considered one at a time.10 The
vector Xit differs depending on the treatment in question, but generally consists of
the same covariates used as controls in the fixed effects regression.
After estimating the propensity score, an algorithm for matching is needed. A
simple way to generate matched pairs is the so-called “nearest available” or “nearest
neighbor” matching,11 in which each observation in the treatment group is paired
with the observation in the control group with the propensity score that is closest to
it, typically in terms of absolute value (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; see Deheija and
Wahba, 2002 for a detailed application).
After matching, without consideration to the dependent variable, the propensity
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score model is adjusted and the matching algorithm is repeated as many times as
necessary to acheive balance. In this particular context, the propensity score model
generally contained the covariates from the fixed effects regression analysis. Higher-
order terms and interactions are included when they increase balance. Additionally,
binary variables or factor variables, such as year, are matched on exactly if that
increases balance. For this analysis, balance is evaluated by comparing differences in
means and qq-plots across covariates, for the treatment and control groups, before
and after matching.12
Once a balanced sample is achieved, the average treatment effect is estimated by
taking the difference of the average of the transformed residual vote rate, weighting
control units by the number of times they appear in the matched sample. Observa-
tions are also weighted by turnout, to facilitate comparision with the other methods.
Standard errors of the estimate are calculated by summing the weighted matched sam-
ple variances for the treated and control groups, and then taking the square root.13
Additionally, the fixed effects regressions are re-estimated on the balanced sample.
2.5 Empirical results
Figures 2.4– 2.7 compare the estimated treatment effects presented in the previous
section, by treatment type.14 For paper ballots, most of the estimates are fairly sim-
ilar, with the exception of county and year fixed effects, which produce the largest
negative estimate. When this same estimator is applied to a matched data set, the
point estimate decreases, although still within the same range. Lever machines also
produced fairly similar results across the estimators, particularly given the large un-
certainty around the final matched data estimate. A varied picture emerges however,
when looking at the estimates for counties switching to optical scanners or electronic
machines. One reason for this variability, is potentially the heterogeneity of machine
types within this category, not because of model dependence. To address this concern,
data from the 2004 election is employed in Section 2.6. First, each of the estimates
are addressed in turn.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to Paper Ballots
2.5.1 Difference-in-differences estimates
The estimates for the 1988–1992 period are not significant. This is very likely due to
the small number of observations in that time period. In each of the remaining three
periods, counties switching to optical scan machines from punch cards experienced
an average drop in residual vote rates, relative to those counties using punch cards
in both elections. This decline ranges from 24% for those switching from 2000 to
2004, to 43% for counties making the switch between 1996 and 2000. Counties in the
1992–1996 time period experienced a decline of 28% in their residual vote rates.15
2.5.2 Fixed effects estimates
The first model includes state and year fixed effects as well as county-specific control
variables. Paper ballots are the “best” technology in terms of reduction in residual
votes—they produce a 34% reduction in the rate of residual voting, relative to punch
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to Lever Machines
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Figure 2.6: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to Optical Scanners
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to DREs
cards. Lever machines are a close second, with a rate of residual voting 30% lower
than punch card machines. Electronic machines and optically scanned ballots produce
smaller improvements over punch cards, but improvements nonetheless. Electronic
machines produced 26% lower rates of residual voting than punch cards. Counties
switching to optical scanners experienced an average decline of 21% in residual votes
over punch card counties. This is a smaller estimate than each of the three difference-
in-difference estimates discussed previous.
The percent of the population aged 18–24 and median income are negatively
related to residual vote rates, while percent of the population that is minority and
percent of the population 65 and older are positively related to residual votes. The
results indicate a negative relationship between shifts in technology and residual votes.
This relationship could be due to counties taking extra precautions to educate voters
during years when a shift in technology occurs. Most of the coefficients on the control
variables have the expected sign. The positive relationship between other prominent
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offices on the ballot and residual votes and the negative relationship between young
voters and residual votes, however, are not as expected. These results may be due to
the omission of other confounding factors at the county-level.
The second model introduces county-level fixed effects, in order to control for the
many unobservable county-level characteristics that remain relatively constant over
time. After controlling for other confounding variables such as contemporaneous gu-
bernatorial and senatorial races, shifts in technology, and the year of the election,
averaging over the changes in residual vote rates as counties change technology pro-
vides a better estimate of the effect of each particular technology type.
This specification produces the same ordering of the equipment types, in terms
reduction in residual vote rates under punch card machines, than the previous model.
Counties using paper ballots generated 49% lower residual vote rates than counties
using punch cards, whereas lever and electronic machines produced 32% and 30%
lower rates of residual voting, respectively, than punch cards. Optical scanners are
still the closest to punch cards, but the magnitude is larger than in the previous
regression—24% rather than 21% lower rates of residual voting.
In sum, the fixed effects models overwhelmingly indicate that punch cards are
the worst technology in terms of rates of residual voting. Paper ballots and lever
machines produce the lowest rates of residual voting. Although electronic machines
and optically scanned ballots do not reduce residual votes at the level estimated for
paper ballots, they certainly fare much better than punch cards.
2.5.3 Propensity score matching estimates
The final estimation method considered is propensity score matching. Taking simple
differences in mean residual vote rates across the matched samples results in a dis-
tinctly different pattern than the fixed effects estimates. Here, electronic machines
and optical scanners fare the best, causing a 41% and 38% reduction in residual
votes for counties that switch from punch cards, respectively. Paper ballots and lever
machines still represent marked improvements over punch cards, with 31% and 32%
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reductions, respectively.
As it is unlikely that we acheive uniform improvement in all observables in the
matching procedure, the minor differences that remain are adjusted by running a
parametric analysis on the parametric data (Ho et al., 2006). Additionally, by includ-
ing fixed effects in the parametric analysis, unobserved fixed confounding variables
are controlled for as well. Again, it is useful to note that the matching procedure
discards observations in one group that are “far away” from the observations in the
opposite group, resulting in a matched data set that looks similar in observed char-
acteristics, and therefore relies less heavily on linearity assumptions when calculating
counterfactuals.
Applying the first fixed effects model to the data, using the same covariates as
in the matching procedure, as well as state and year fixed effects, once again yields
a new pattern. Here, paper ballots are the stars, with a 31% reduction in residual
vote rates, while optical scanners are a close second with a 28% reduction in rates.
Electronic machines produce an estimated 24% reduction in residual vote rates, when
counties switch from punch cards. The second equation continues to champion paper
ballots, optical scanners, and electronic machines, however lever machines no longer
are distinguishable from punch cards in their effect on residual votes.
2.6 An extension and future research
After research on the 2000 election debacle emerged, better data-collection practices
have been advocated. One of the results of this advocacy is the availability of specific
manufacturer or model types, for much of the data. This information allows the sepa-
ration of counties using optical scanners into two types—those who count their optical
scan ballots at a central location, away from the voter, and those who count their
ballots in the precinct, allowing voters the opportunity to resubmit voided ballots.
For electronic machines, we can again distinguish two types of counties—those who
record the votes mechanically, similarly to a lever machine, and those who record the
votes electronically, on the newer ATM-style touchscreen machines. One additional
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piece of data available for 2004 is the Election Assistance Commission’s Election Day
Survey (2005). From this survey, two additional covariates are added to the analysis:
First, the reported average number of poll workers in a precinct, and second, the re-
ported average number of polling places in a precinct. These both may contribute to
educational and organization factors that influence residual votes, and are certaintly
correlated with technology.
The analysis of the 2004 data begins with a linear model, which has the trans-
formed residual vote rate as the dependent variable, and the same covariates as in
the first fixed effects regression above. Additionally, the two EAC variables were
included, as well as state fixed effects. Then a matched sample was obtained for
each of the four treatment groups by repeating the matching algorithm with different
propensity models until balance was as good as possible. In each case, the treated
and control groups in the matched sample were more alike in their distribution of
covariates than these groups in the raw data. Because uniform improvement in all
covariates to the degree of 100% bias reduction is unlikely, the fixed effects estimator
was applied to the matched samples.16 Unfortunately, there were relatively few cases
of counties using touchscreen technology that were sufficiently similar to punch card
counties to create a sizable matched sample. As a result, the parametric estimation
was not performed on this group.
Figures 2.8–2.11 compare the estimates for this analysis. Counties switching from
punch cards to centrally-counted optical scanners do not gain a distinguishable im-
provement in residual vote rates, by any of the estimates. Precinct-counted optical
scanners do quite well by the regression estimate and the simple differences estimate
on the matched sample. Once controlling for unobserved factors on the matched
sample, however, these benefits are no longer apparent. For both of the electronic
machine types, the pattern is varied. Matching produces estimates of large reductions
in residual votes when changing to electronic machines, but regression estimates do
not pick up this distinction.
Although it appears that model dependency is driving some of the results, there is
a final consideration for the electronic machines. Rather than focusing on the tallying
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Figure 2.8: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to Central Count Opscan in 2004
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Figure 2.9: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from Punch
Cards to Precinct Count Opscan in 2004
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Figure 2.10: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from
Punch Cards to Electronic DRE
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Figure 2.11: Estimated Treatment Effect for an Average County Switching from
Punch Cards to Electronic Touchscreen
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of votes—mechanical or electronic—perhaps the machines should be sorted according
to whether there are prompts or mechanisms that prevent overvoting or undervoting of
races. For instance, some touchscreen machines display a warning message if a voter
attempts to leave a race blank, whereas other touchscreen machines have no such
message. This may be the right place to focus, and is an interesting focus for future
research. Another suggestion for future research would be to incorporate data from
contests for offices other than president, such as U.S. senator and gubernatorial races.
This would provide another four panels to the data, if all midyear elections between
1988 and 2004 were added, and might help clear up the picture. Although the results
do appear to be somewhat dependent on the linearity assumptions of the regression
models, there is the comforting fact that punch cards nonetheless perform poorly
across the board, and the current push toward precinct-counted optically scanned
ballots and electronic machines appears to be in the right direction.
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2.7 Notes
1See Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005 for a detailed discussion of previous literature on
the performance of voting technologies.
2Although historically some citizens have faced challenges to voting, such as diffi-
culties with registration or polling place accessibility, these subjects are beyond the
scope of this paper.
3For a detailed account of particular machine types and their features, please see
the report at the Center for American Politics and Citizenship (2003).
4The different variables that influence a voter’s ability to indicate his intended
preference in an election, both in and out of the voting booth, are interesting ques-
tions in their own right and have been the subject of recent research. See especially
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2001; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2003; and
Highton, 2004.
5This data was kindly shared within the VTP by Steve Ansolabehere and Charles
Stewart.
6These cases represent less than 2% of the total sample. Some examples are
observations where the residual vote rate is negative, or when it is much higher than
is generally believed to be plausible, such as a residual vote rate of 50%. These cases
have been eliminated until the election returns can be confirmed.
7See Greene, 2003, 287–293, for a detailed discussion of fixed effects models.
8Demographic variables are linearly interpolated from the U.S. Decentennial Cen-
sus and median income comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
9These regressions were estimated using the STATA command areg. In addition
to the specifications presented above, I tested for the effect of outliers by re-estimating
the models after dropping outliers from the data. Outliers are defined to be those
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observations with unusually low (less than 0.1%) or unusually high (greater than 10%)
levels of residual vote rates. The results on the restricted sample do not change the
coefficients on the technology indicators significantly and therefore are not presented
here.
10Although a generalized propensity score model (as suggested in Imbens (2000)
and further developed in Imai and Van Dyk (2004))—such as estimating a multi-
nomial propensity score for the treatment, T jit, j = 0, 1, . . . , 4—prevents the loss
of information that occurs when considering each pair, (T 1it, T
0
it), separately, the full
implications of the model in this context are not immediately clear. Additionally, it
is not obvious that the computational difficulties will outweigh the benefit. This is
left for future research.
11Operationally, the matching algorithm was implemented with the package “Match-
ing” written for the R programming language and statistical software by Sekhon
(2006).
12The results from the final matching stages are presented in the Appendix.
13This estimate is too small, because it does not take into account uncertainty
involved in the matching procedure or uncertainty from estimating the propensity
score. See Abadie and Imbens (2004) for an alternative approach.
14Full estimation results are presented in the Appendix.
15To test whether partial or total pooling is appropriate for this data, dummy vari-
ables for each period were interacted with the independent variables in the estimated
equation, detailed in Section 5.1. The intercepts of the equations corresponding to
each time period differ significantly. The unobservable, fixed temporal effects can be
captured by introducing year fixed effects into the model, the starting point for the
specifications in the next section.
16The results of the final matched samples are available from the author.
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Chapter 3
Incumbency advantage as an
illustration of obtaining reliable
causal estimates with classical
linear models
Incumbency advantage is a much-studied phenomenon in political science.17 Stud-
ies have tackled the problem of measuring incumbency advantage in various ways,
ranging from the measures of sophomore surge and retirement slump; the use of term
limits, redistricting, and deaths in office to avoid selection bias; and measurement
models in the form of both classical regression and hierarchical Bayesian regression.
At present, I know of no other study that approaches the problem of measuring incum-
bency advantage using matching methods. As many proponents of matching methods
will argue, matching is generally preferable to classical linear regression because the
assumption of independence conditional on observing all relevant covariates is ex-
plicit in both models, but matching methods do not suffer from model dependency,
as classical linear models can.
Incumbency advantage is an interesting example of causal inference in political
science because the treatment—incumbency status—is relatively independent of other
predictors in the model from the start. One would think that in this scenario, match-
ing would produce the same estimates as the linear model but with increased un-
certainty, as a consequence of the reduced sample size. However, the results in this
paper show that this is not always the case. If the proxy for treatment assignment
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is a bad predictor, such as when the researcher chooses the propensity score model
based on predictors that are correlated with the outcome—typically control variables
in a linear regression—but without regard to the fact that they are uncorrelated with
the treatment, the matching procedure will be essentually an ad hoc sample of the
original data. If the researcher has a bad draw—even if the matched sample appears
to be “balanced”—the estimates from the matched sample will not only be biased,
they will be excessively precise, leading to confidence about incorrect estimates. As
the process is subject to uncertainty, researchers considering matching in favor of
linear regression should consider the likelihood of model dependency and proceed
with caution if the best propensity score model is not likely to be close to the “true”
propensity score model. This point seems straightforward, but it is important to
emphasize the potential error in poor modeling choices that may arise from choosing
estimators by the current fashion rather than by careful analysis.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 formulates incumbency
advantage as a causal inference problem and discusses in further detail previous at-
tempts to measure it. Section 3.2 describes the data utilized and presents the model.
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 contrast linear regression estimates and average treatment effect
calculations after matching. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Formulating incumbency advantage as a causal
inference problem
The incumbency advantage, informally, is the benefit in vote share that an incumbent
legislator enjoys over a non-incumbent challenger. Isolating this quantity is difficult
for several reasons. Essentially, the problem is missing data: we want to estimate
the difference between the proportion of the vote share that the incumbent legislator
receives when running for re-election (which is unobserved in an open seat race) and
the proportion of the vote share the incumbent party wins if the incumbent legislator
does not run (which is unobserved in an election with an incumbent candidate). If
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incumbency were randomly assigned, we could make assumptions regarding the ex-
changability of the two scenarios and achieve reasonable estimates for the unobserved
counterfactuals. But, in fact, incumbency is not randomly assigned across districts.
We cannot perform an experiment randomly distributing incumbent status across
candidates in a controlled election setting. Thus we find ourselves squarely in the
realm of observational studies.
One problem we might face is selection bias. Perhaps incumbent legislators are
systematically higher-quality candidates than their challengers. Or it may be the case
that incumbent legislators only enter into a race if they expect to win it. If either of
these are the case, we do not observe two critical instances for measurement: first,
the low-quality incumbent (of such a low quality that he is not elected in the first
place), and second, the incumbent legislator who knows he will lose re-election.
Previous research has suggested that term limits provide a natural experiment
from which to study incumbency advantage, as it avoids the above problem of strategic
retirement (Ansolabere and Snyder 2002). This approach suffers from selection bias
as well. To see that this is the case, let the terminal election cycle when term limits
force the incumbent candidate out of office be in time T . One way to measure the
incumbency advantage, then, is to compare the incumbent candidate’s vote share
in election T − 1 (his last election) and the vote share of the incumbent’s party in
election T (the election for the open seat). At first glance this may seem sensible, but
consider that challengers face a decision as to when to enter the race. High-quality
challengers may systematically avoid running against an incumbent in time T − 1
and defer their candidacy to the open seat race in time T . And then the measure of
incumbency advantage would be biased.
Two other popular measures of incumbency advantage are sophomore surge and
retirement slump. Sophomore surge is defined to be the average vote gain for fresh-
man winners in election 1 who run again in election 2. Retirement slump is defined
to be the average vote loss for parties who candidates won in election 1 and did not
run in election 2. But, as proved in King and Gelman (1990), both of these mea-
sures are biased. Sophomore surge underestimates the incumbency advantage, while
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retirement slump overestimates it. Further, while the average of these two quantities,
the “slurge,” is a better estimate of the incumbency advantage, it is still biased. The
paper goes on to define a linear regression model that uncovers an unbiased mea-
sure incumbency advantage. This model is a starting point for this analysis and is
discussed in detail in Section 3.2 below.
3.2 Data and methods
The data available on congressional elections in the United States is quite extensive.
The unit of analysis for this data is a (district, year) pair and the data span all
congressional districts in the United States from 1898–2002. The data include election
returns for both major parties, a variable denoting whether an incumbent ran for re-
election (and if so, his party), and a variable denoting whether redistricting occured
immediately prior to that election cycle.18 Years in which redistricting occured are
eliminated from the sample.
A useful starting point in modeling the data is the unbiased estimator from Gelman
and King (1990)
vjt = β0t + β1tvj,t−1 + β2tPjt + ΦtIjt + νjt (3.1)
where:
vjt is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in district j at election t;
vj,t−1 is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in district j at election t− 1;
Pjt equals 1 if the Democrats are the incumbent party (i.e., a Democratic candidate
won at election t − 1) and -1 if the Republicans are the incumbent party in
district j at election t;
Ijt equals 1 if there is a Democratic incumbent, 0 if there are no incumbents and
-1 if there is a Republican incumbent seeking reelection in district j at time t
(note that this definition ignores the possibility of two or more incumbents in
a given district since redistricting years are excluded from the analysis);
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and νjt is an error term.
This formulation compares vote shares in incumbent districts to vote shares in
districts with open seats, controlling for the effect of the incumbent party and the
vote share in the previous election. It is useful to reparameterize the coding such that
the treatment is binary. Let the treatment be the decision of candidate to run for
reelection. Then,
Ijt = TjtPjt (3.2)
where:
Tjt equals 1 if the party runs a new candidate in district j at time t, and 0 if the
incumbent legislator is running for reelection in district j at time t,
and Equation 3.1 above becomes:
vjt = β0t + β1tvj,t−1 + β2tPjt + ΦtTjtPjt + νjt. (3.3)
Gelman and Huang (2007) present a hierarchical model of the incumbency advan-
tage that allows the advantage to vary between incumbents. As I am not interested
in the variation in incumbency advantage, but rather in a precise estimate of the av-
erage effect of incumbency across districts, the classical model is employed here. An
extremely important, though under-emphasized, feature of the Gelman-Huang model
is the inclusion of a lagged value of the incumbent party. That is, for election t, the
term Pj,t−1 is included in the model. Including this term in the model maintains the
structure of estimating incumbency advantage for pairs of elections—comparing dis-
tricts with incumbents to districts with open seats—but results in significantly more
precise estimates. Thus, the full model used for the classical linear regression here,
and as a starting point for the propensity score model below, is:
vjt = β0t + β1tvj,t−1 + β2tPj,t−1 + ΦtTjtPjt + νjt. (3.4)
The intuition behind this result is that as more information is added to the model, the
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estimator gains efficiency. To see this, first note that one of the best-known predictors
of current outcomes is generally the previous outcome(s). To this end, the Gelman-
King structure models vote share, vjt, as a function of incumbency, Ijt, incumbent
party, Pjt, and previous vote share, vj,t−1. Next, note that the term Pjt adds little to
no new information to the model, as in virtually all cases, Pjt = 1 ⇐⇒ vj,t−1 > 0.5.
But, including Pj,t−1 in the model does give new information—information about vi,t−2
– as Pi,t−1 = 1 ⇐⇒ vi,t−2 > 0.5 generally. The structure of the model as estimating
the change between election t and election t−1 is maintained, but information about
the twice-lagged vote share is implied.
3.3 Classical linear regression approach
The estimates from Equations 3.4 and 3.3 can be seen in Figure 3.1 below. The
left graph entitled “Model 1” refers to Equation 3.4, while the right graph refers to
Equation 3.3. The y-axis on both graphs ranges from -0.05 to 0.15 and represents
the average gain in democratic vote share for an incumbent. The x-axis ranges from
1898–2002 representing the election years in the sample. Each point on the graph is an
estimate of Φˆt and the vertical bars through each point represent the 95% confidence
interval around the estimate. Note that the years ending in “2” do not have estimates.
This is because redistricting occurs after each decentennial census and the election
immediately following redistricting is dropped from the sample.
Looking first at the graph on the right, the estimates replicate Gelman and King
(1990) with the addition of recent election years. As they point out, consistent with
congressional elections literature, the incumbency advantage has been increasing over
time and—contrasting with estimates of the “slurge”—there is positive benefit to
incumbency as far back as 1900. The graph on the left is the new specification that is
a hybrid of the Gelman-King and the Gelman-Huang estimators. The general pattern
remains the same as in the original model. Incumbency advantage has increased over
time and there are positive benefits to incumbency estimated as far back as 1900.
In contrast to the original model, however, the measure is much less variable. This
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Figure 3.1: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals of Incumbency Advantage, Raw
Data
is because the model is more reliable and statistically efficient as a result of the
additional information provided by the Pj,t−1 term.
3.4 Propensity score matching approach
The propensity score matching methods developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
attempt to overcome the problem of discerning treatment effects in observational
studies by explicitly conditioning on observables. The problem in identifying treat-
ment effects is essentially a missing data problem—the treatment group is observed
and the outcome conditional on treatment assignment is observed, but the counter-
factual is not observed. In this case, we observe incumbency status, and we observe
the democratic vote share in each district j in election t conditional on incumbency
status.
Advocates of matching argue that we should prefer these semi-parametric meth-
ods since there is clear standard for choosing an optimal model—it is the one that
balances the covariates, X, and no functional form is implied for the relationship
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between the treatment and the outcome (Sekhon, 2004). But a key assumption
in matching, as in classical linear regression, is that there are no variables left un-
observed that are correlated with treatment, Tjt, and the outcome, vjt. As exact
matching is not practical in many scenarios—X is multidimensional and contains
continuous covariates—practitioners generally rely on a result due to Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983), which demonstrates that it is enough to condition on the propensity
score, p(X) = pr(T = 1|X). As the true propensity score is not known, it must
be estimated. The generally acceptable place to start is with a logistic (or probit)
regression of the treatment on the covariates in the linear model. Of course, as the
propensity score is not known, only estimated, we could very well be conditioning on
the wrong scalar! Ho et al. (2006) point out what they call the “propensity score
tautology”:
The estimated propensity score is a balancing score when we have a consis-
tent estimate of the true propensity score. We know we have a consistent
estimate of the propensity score when matching on the propensity score
balances the raw covariates. Of course, once we have balance on the co-
variates, we are done and do not need to look back. That is, it works
when it works, and when it does not work, it does not work.
In the case of incumbency advantage, the seemingly obvious place to start is a model
of incumbency as a function of the prior outcome—vote share in election t− 1—and
additional covariates such as the incumbent party.
Tjt = Φ(β0 + β1vj,t−1 + β2Pjt + β3Pj,t−1) (3.5)
where the variables are as above and Φ is the normal cdf.
Previous researchers have noted that the lack of correlation between incumbency
and previous vote status in the district make the problem less susceptible to model
dependency (Gelman and King, 1990; Gelman and Huang, 2007). And indeed this is
the case for most years in the data.
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Figure 3.2: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals of Marginal Effect of Vote Share
on Incumbency Advantage
Figure 3.2 presents the point estimates representing the average marginal effect
of vote share in the previous election on the probability of an incumbent running for
election at time t across all districts j based on Equation 3.4. That is, the point
estimates plot βˆ1 and the dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals across
the years in the sample. For the majority of the years, the confidence interval spans
the unit interval indicating that there is virtually no predictive power of vj,t−1 on
Tjt. One year that stands out in the graph is 1994. This is an interesting case
politically, as 1994 was the first time the Republican party took control of the House
of Representatives in 40 years. Many changes in the electoral environment have been
hypothesized to effect the Republican victory, but it is certain that a larger than
normal number of districts that would otherwise have held incumbents no longer did.
That election is systematically distinct from the other years and, as such, we would
expect the results from that year to be a bit off.
Nonetheless, suppose that a researcher did not consult the uncertainty estimates
of the propensity score estimate, but rather turned to the question of balancing the
data. As the treatment is uncorrelated with the covariates in question, the two
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samples would appear to be balanced for virtually any sample drawn from them,
regardless of the propensity score.
To consider this scenario, two matched samples are drawn. One is based on a
propensity score, as in Equation 3.4, and another includes the lagged-value of the
treatment, Tj,t−1, in the equation as well. A balanced sample is achieved based on
any traditionally accepted metric: minimizing the maximum distance between qq-
plots of the two samples, minimizing the average distance between qq-plots of the
two samples, and minimizing the median distance between the two qq-plots.19 Once
a balanced sample is achieved, the average treatment effect is estimated by repeating
the estimation procedure in Section 3.3 above.
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Figure 3.3: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals of Incumbency Advantage,
Matched Data — Specification 1
The results from estimating incumbency advantage using Equations 3.4 and 3.3
on matched samples obtained from the two propensity score specifications can be seen
in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 above. In each figure, the left graph entitled “Model 1”
refers to Equation 3.4, while the right graph refers to Equation 3.3. The y-axis on both
graphs ranges from -0.05 to 0.15 and represents the average gain in Democratic vote
share for an incumbent. The x-axis ranges from 1898–2002 representing the election
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Figure 3.4: Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals of Incumbency Advantage,
Matched Data — Specification 2
years in the sample. Each point on the graph is an estimate of Φˆt and the vertical bars
through each point represent the 95% confidence interval around the estimate. Note
that the years ending in “2” do not have estimates. This is because redistricting occurs
after each decentennial census and the election immediately following redistricting is
dropped from the sample.
There are two major points to take away from these graphs. First, although there
is no reason based on balance tests to choose one propensity score model over the
other, the results from each specification vary greatly. That is, how the sample is
drawn affects the estimates, even if both samples appear to be “balanced.” Second,
comparing these figures to Figure 3.1 above, the estimates on the matched samples
are more variable across time, but generally more precise within an election year. The
estimates change not only between the raw data and the matched sample, but across
the matched samples as well. The estimates in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 have smaller stan-
dard errors in general than the estimates in Figure 3.1, but jump around a great deal.
This is a concern because we would expect that changes in incumbency advantage
over time would occur smoothly, with the exception of a few shocks to the system, as
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we see in Model 1 in Figure 3.1. Another great concern is the difference in estimates
across the two matched samples. Another advantage to the parametric model applied
to the raw data is the replicability of the results.
3.5 Discussion
So, what’s going on here? Do we have a case of model dependency? Is it a case of
poor specification? Our initial hypothesis is that matching shouldn’t help much, but
it shouldn’t hurt either. All the sensible candidates for confounders aren’t in fact
confounders. They aren’t correlated with the treatment, so we’d expect standard
errors to increase as a result of a decreased sample size, but that’s about it. In fact,
we are in a situation where the practical application of matching is at odds with
the theoretical properties behind matching. Applied researchers turn to matching to
simulate a quasi-experimental setting. The idea is to make sure the treatment and
control groups look alike, so that any heterogeneity that might confound the causal
effect of the treatment on the outcome is eliminated. But the problem here is that
we’re selecting matched pairs that are alike, but they might be alike in the wrong
way. It is a case where we don’t know the propensity score in truth and we probably
can’t know it with the data in hand—so matching might actually do worse. Since the
treatment isn’t correlated with these covariates, a propensity score based on them is
the wrong metric on which to base a sample, even though they are the right covariates
in the regression and even though traditional balance metrics pass.
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3.6 Notes
17See e.g., Erikson, 1971; Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and
Katz, 1996; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000; and Gelman and Huang, 2004.
18The data for the years 1898–1992 are from ICPSR data set 6311 “Elections to the
United States House of Representatives, 1898–1992,” Gary King (Principal Investi-
gator). The data for years 1994–2002 come from Gary Jacobson. Professor Jacobson
also supplied data spanning 1946–1992 which was cross-checked against the ICPSR
data.
19These results are available from the author.
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Chapter 4
Measuring the impact of voter
identification laws on turnout as an
example of causal inference with
ordinal treatment variables
Since the 2000 presidential election, much debate has centered on election reform—
either through changing the technology used to cast and count ballots, expanding
ballot access to include absentee and early voting, introducing statewide uniformity
into the registration databases, or requiring identification at the polls. One of the
many reforms included in the Help America Vote Act (2002) was to require that
all new registrants show proof of identification, either with their application or the
first time they visit the polls. Since the passage of HAVA, many states have pushed
for additional voter identification requirements, in particular, requirements that all
voters show identification before they are allowed to participate in any election. As
of just prior to the 2006 general election, roughly half of the states were requiring
some form of voter identification from all voters (Electionline.org, 2006).
There is little research on the effect that voter identification requirements, of any
form, have on voter participation. Thus, while both HAVA and nearly half of the
states have implemented voter identification requirements by the 2006 general elec-
tion, there is little understanding about whether these requirements reduce voter
participation, and whether they reduce the participation rates of certain classes of
voters. This is a difficult problem. Identification requirements are not randomly
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distributed across states and implementation may vary across states, within an iden-
tification requirement. The data is sparse—there are only 50 states and two years
in our data—and the only implementation of photo identification requirements are
outside the range of the current data.20 Finally, the treatment variable—the level of
identification required—is ordinal. This chapter approaches the problem in two ways.
First, a novel methodology is used to study the effects of voter identification require-
ments on the likelihood that voters participated in these two presidential elections, a
multilevel binary logit model which allows us to appropriately model how covariates
from both the individual and state level, and their interaction, affect the decision
to participate (Gelman and Hill, 2006). Second, I suggest a model for the proper
handling of the ordinal nature of the voter identification variable. Each approach
addresses an area of concern for this research question: the former, addresses how to
get the most of the sparse data to answer important policy questions, particularly
about subgroups; the latter, addresses the proper modeling of the ordinal treatment
variable. Ideally, these two approaches would be combined.21
Ordinal variables—categorical variables with a defined order to the categories,
but without equal spacing between them—are quite common in social science appli-
cations. Some examples include political ideology (liberal, moderate, conservative),
partisan identification (Democrat, Independent, Republican), education and income
(categorized differently across survey designs), the closing date of voter registration
(30 days, 28 days, 21 days, election day registration), or the degree of local flooding
caused by hurricane Katrina (see Alvarez et al., 2007b for an interesting example
of this). Although a good deal of research exists on the proper modeling of ordinal
response variables, there is not a clear directive as to how to model ordinal treatment
variables. A good deal of the confusion arises from measurement difficulty. Many or-
dinal variables in social science have a true underlying structure that may be interval
or even continuous that the measurement instrument fails to capture. This may be
due to poor design, such as in the case of survey questions, or perhaps due to sparse
data. Voter identification requirements, for example, are coded based on “sensible”
breakpoints in the data, even though the effect of implementation differences—both
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across poll sites and across individual voters—results in practically an infinite array of
requirement levels. Even once the researcher deals with measurement issues, the cod-
ing scheme applied varies greatly—whether contrasts are made to a mean value or a
base category, or if some degree of “threshold” levels are contrasted. Admittedly, the
choice is generally clear based on ease of interpretation. Classical modeling options
for ordinal variables generally consist of either fully unconstrained, though additive,
ordinal group indicators or a numeric predictor constrained to be continuous. Typi-
cally it is difficult to employ group indicators and still constrain the variable structure
in that setting. Generalized additive models are an exception, however, and adding
nonlinearities to the classical constrained model can be useful. This paper proposes
the use of Bayesian shrinkage (or empirical Bayes) estimators to model the ordinal
nature of the voter identification variable. Essentially, empirical Bayes estimators
allow the model to contain both individual group level indicators and a continuous
predictor. Thus, each individual effect can be arbitrary, but the model “shrinks”
the estimates toward a linear framework according to the data.22 The next sections
present the general methodology and the data utilized (the 2000 and 2004 Current
Population Survey Voter Supplements, from the U.S. Census Bureau). Then the spe-
cific model formulation for this example is presented. The final section presents the
empirical results.
4.1 Data
The data for the analysis consists of two levels—state and individual. The state
level institutional data were obtained from state election administration websites and
electionline.org. This data consists of the state voter identification laws in 2000 and
2004. The laws in place take a variety of forms, but can be classified into the following
groups:
• Voter must state his/her name.
• Voter must sign his/her name in a pollbook.
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• Voter must sign his/her name in a pollbook and it must match a signature on
file.
• Voter must present proof of identification or voter registration card.23
This coding is based on “sensible” breakpoints in the data even though the effect
of implementation differences—both across poll sites and across individual voters—
results in practically an infinite array of requirement levels. The level of measurement
is at the state level, based on state election codes, so we have at least 50 possible
implementations, but probably more. The sparseness of the data, however, requires
some form of parametric or interval restrictions on the variable. While identification
requirements are certainly ordered in terms of strictness (or ease of compliance),
beyond that many representations could be arguably sensible. There is likely some
linear structure to the impact of requirements on turnout: the requirement of stating
one’s name requires very little extra effort on behalf of the voter, while remembering
to bring an identification card to the polls is certain to dissuade a least a handful
of voters. On the other hand, perhaps the difficulty of matching one’s signature
to a version on file from one’s registration (perhaps many years prior) is a sufficient
burden (and certainly frustrating) that additional requirements have little to no effect
on turnout. It is this nature of the variable that suggests a model which incorporates
both structures and allows the data to “speak” as to which structure best fits.
The heterogeneity both between states and across time can be seen most clearly
by comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2.24 The maps depict the voter identification laws in
the United States in 2000 and 2004. The lightest shade represents the “state name”
requirement, while the darkest shade represents the requirement for some form of
ID card. In 2000, nine states had the weakest identification requirement, 18 states
required a signature to vote, nine states required a matching signature, and 15 states
required a recognized identification card. In 2004, seven states only required voters
to state their name at the polls, 13 states required a signature, eight states required
a matching signature, and 23 states had the strictest requirement. In addition to the
heterogeneity between states, eight states strengthened their identification require-
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ments between 2000 and 2004—all switched to requiring government identification
cards. No states weakened their requirements.
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Figure 4.1: Voter Identification Laws, 2000
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Figure 4.2: Voter Identification Laws, 2004
The individual-level data is based on a subset of the questions asked in the
2000 and 2004 Current Population Survey Voter Supplements. In addition to socio-
economic and demographic questions, the respondents were asked if they were regis-
tered to vote in that year’s presidential election, and, conditional on registration, if
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they did vote in the election. One of the major benefits of using the CPS for this anal-
ysis is the large sample size and coverage of major demographic groups. Tables C.1
and C.2 present contingency tables describing the distribution of respondents across
various demographic groups for each year.
4.2 Model
Measuring the impact of voter identification laws on voter turnout is a difficult prob-
lem for several reasons: the data are sparse, there is heterogeneity both in imple-
mentation and in population, the treatment variable is not randomly assigned and
is ordinal in nature. There are several options as to how to model the problem. A
strictly state-level model utilizing aggregate election returns is useful as it does not
suffer any of the reporting error that plagues survey data, but is subject to aggrega-
tion bias, questions of ecological inference, and a thin data matrix. In addition, the
denominator in measuring turnout rates is largely inflated due to insufficient purg-
ing of voter rolls. Individual data from the Current Population Survey is beneficial
because of the large sample size and excellent coverage (with around 120,000 respon-
dents per year). Individual responses provide information on important subgroups
for policy questions, as we are able to isolate effects by education level, age group,
income level, or racial and ethnic background. There is concern, however, as to the
level of misreporting of turnout in survey data.
The analysis begins with a logistic model of turnout from the CPS. Because we are
interested in the effect of identification requirements at the polls and not the various
unobserved barriers to voting associated with the registration process, the estimation
is conditioned on the subset of respondents who are registered to vote.
Pr(Yit = 1) = logit
−1(α+ β0Zit + β1Xit), for i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2; (4.1)
where i indexes the respondents and t indexes years. The variable Yit is binary and
equal to unity if the respondent reported voting in that year’s presidential election.
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The variable α is an intercept term. The variable Zit is the variable of interest
(VoterID) has four levels, j = 1, . . . , 4, the specification of which varies by the model
and is discussed in detail below. The vector of covariates, Xit, includes the following:
• South: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent resides in a southern state;
• Female: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent is female;
• Education: a ordinal variable indicating the reported level of education—’some
high school,’ ’high school graduate,’ ’some college,’ or ’college graduate’—
centered at its mean;
• Education2: the squared value of Education centered at its mean;
• Age: the respondent’s age in years centered at its mean;
• Age2: the squared value of Age centered at its mean;
• Income: an ordinal variable indicating the reported level of education that takes
on 13 values—ranging from ’Less than $5,000’ to ’More than $75,000’—centered
at its mean;
• Non-White: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent reported a race other
than White.
4.2.1 Modeling the impact of voter ID on individuals
The first approach models the impact of voter identification upon subgroups of in-
terest, namely lower educated, minority, and elderly voters. To that end, a series of
interaction terms are included in the vector of covariates, Xit:
• Education*VoterID : the interaction between the respondent’s reported level of
education and the voter identification requirement in the respondent’s state;
• Education2*VoterID : the interaction between the squared value of Education
and the voter identification requirement in the respondent’s state;
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• Age*VoterID : the interaction between the respondent’s age and the voter iden-
tification requirement in the respondent’s state;
• Age2*VoterID : the interaction between the squared value of Age and the voter
identification requirement in the respondent’s state; and
• NonWhite*VoterID : the interaction between the indicator denoting a reported
race other than White and the voter identification requirement in the respon-
dent’s state.
To allow for unobserved effects on turnout at the state-level and yearly shocks, we
allow for a random intercept term that is shared by respondents in a given (state,
year) pair.
α = αs[i] + αt[i] + αs∗t[i], for i = 1, . . . , N ; s = 1, . . . , 51; t = 1, 2. (4.2)
In words, each respondent has an intercept term that consists of a random in-
tercept, αs[i] that is shared by all respondents i in state s, αt[i] that is shared by all
respondents i in year t, and αs∗t[i] that is shared by all respondents i in state s in year
t.
It may also be the case that a voter identification requirement is implemented
differently across the states. To allow for this possibility, the model includes a random
coefficient on voter identification that varies by state.
Pr(Yi = 1) = logit
−1(αi + (β0 + γs[i])Zi + β1Xi + i),
for i = 1, . . . , N ; s = 1, . . . , 51; t = 1, 2. (4.3)
and α is as in Equation 2. That is, the effect of a voter identification requirement on
the probability that two individuals i and j will vote has a common mean, β0, but
varies by a random term that is indexed by state, γs[i] and γs[j].
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4.2.2 Modeling the ordinal nature of voter ID
The second framework explores the ordinal nature of the voter identification variable.
The vector of covariates, Xit, is as follows:
• South: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent resides in a southern state;
• Female: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent is female;
• Education: a ordinal variable indicating the reported level of education—’some
high school,’ ’high school graduate,’ ’some college,’ or ’college graduate’—
centered at its mean;
• Education2: the squared value of Education centered at its mean;
• log(Age): the log of the respondent’s age in years centered at its mean;
• Income: an ordinal variable indicating the reported level of education that takes
on 13 values—ranging from ’Less than $5,000’ to ’More than $75,000’—centered
at its mean;
• Non-White: an indicator equal to unity if the respondent reported a race other
than White.
In the first model, there will be no constraints put on Zit and it will appear in the
specification as three indicator variables—Z2it, Z
3
it, Z
4
it—interpreted relative to the base
category Z1it. These correspnd to Zitj = State Name, Sign Name, Match Signature,
Present ID. In the second model, Zit is constrained numerically to be a continuous
variable ranging from 1 to 4. An alternative coding scheme, which is not considered
here, would be to have three indicator variables where Zitj = State Name, State Name
or Sign Name, State Name or Sign Name or Match Signature, State Name or Sign
Name or Match Signature or Present ID. This would be more useful if we had many
more categories and wished to look for appropriate breakpoints in the data. As there
are only four categories, however, this coding is not used.
51
For the multilevel model, again starting with a logistic model of turnout, letting
the intercept term vary by group (VoterID) level.
Pr(Yit = 1) = logit
−1(αj[i],t + β1Xit), for i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, 2; j = 1, . . . 4. (4.4)
αjt = γ0 + γ1Zjt + νjt, νjt ∼ N(0, σtα). (4.5)
The parameters to estimate from the model are θ = {α, β, γ, σα, σy}, where α =
(α1, . . . , αj)
′, β = (β1, . . . βk)′, and γ = (γ0, γ1). Specifically for this data, the pa-
rameters estimated are a 4 x 1 matrix of group level intercepts, a 9 x 1 matrix of
coefficients on the 9 control variables, and a 1 x 2 matrix of coefficients on the group-
level predictor variable for each of the years in the data. A final consideration is
about interpretation of the γ1 parameter. This parameter is partially not identified
between it and the linear trend in the νj parameters. The identification is partial, as
the νj parameters are pooled toward zero, but with only J = 4 groups, converging
the algorithm is time consuming. To correct for this problem, after estimation, the
data is “post-processed” to obtain finite population slope parameters based on the
regression of αj on Zj. This is equivalent to constraining the νj parameters to have
mean zero and slope zero (Gelman and Hill, 2006).
The estimation is implemented with a Gibbs sampling algorithm via the statistical
software JAGS (Plummer 2007). Independent conjugate priors are assumed for each
element of β and γ and for the variances. Specifically, each β and γ is assumed
to be distributed normally, with mean zero and precision parameter 0.0001. The
parameters σy and σα are assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 100.
Given the large size of the CPS data and the computational intensity of the program,
the results presented below are based on only one year, 2000.25 Prior estimation
on the years separately indicates very little difference in the estimates across years,
however. I let the algorithm run for 25,000 iterations as a burn-in, and then run
for 50,000 iterations, keeping every 10th iteration. The estimates are based on the
resulting 5000 draws from the posterior distributions.26
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4.3 The impact of voter identification on subgroup
turnout
Figure 4.3 displays the marginal effect in the odds of an individual voting in each
year, for the covariates in the model. Living in the South decreases the odds that an
individual votes, while being female increases the odds of voting. Being a minority
does not increase the probability of voting. Each additional category of schooling
greatly increases the odds of an individual turning out to vote, whereas age and income
increase the odds slightly. These effects all are consistent with the previous literature
on turnout, lending credence to the model specification (e.g., Nagler, 1991). It is
interesting to note, however, that voter identification requirements have no impact
on voter turnout—even within subgroups that might be disproportionately affected.
One possible explanation for this result is that once an individual has taken the steps
to register to vote, the further imposition of a voter identification requirement is no
extra burden.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 examine the impact of voter identification on subgroups fur-
ther. In each figure, the probability that an average individual turnouts to vote,
conditional on voter identification regime, education level, and minority status is
plotted. The state chosen for the average individual is Ohio, as it is generally rep-
resentative. The blue lines represent the probability of voting by education level for
nonwhite respondents, the black lines for white respondents. The dashed lines denote
the 95% confidence regions around the estimates. Not only is there no significant
difference in turnout probabilities between white and nonwhite respondents, there is
no significant difference across the voter identification regimes as well.
4.4 Comparing estimates of the ordinal models
Figure 4.6 presents the estimates from Equation 4.2 both with the voter identification
variable, Zit, constrained and unconstrained, and the estimates from Equations 4.4
and 4.5 of the Bayesian shrinkage model. The horizontal axis of the graph ranges
53
2000
Odds Ratios
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
South
Female
NonWhite
Educ
Educ^2
Age
Age^2
Income
VoterID
Educ*ID
Educ^2 * ID
Age*ID
Age^2 * ID
Nonwhite*ID
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
2004
Odds Ratios
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
South
Female
NonWhite
Educ
Educ^2
Age
Age^2
Income
VoterID
Educ*ID
Educ^2 * ID
Age*ID
Age^2 * ID
Nonwhite*ID
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Figure 4.3: Marginal Odds of Voting Relative to the Mean Observation
from 0.5 to 2.5 and represents the coefficient estimates from the logistic regressions
described above. The point estimates are the black dots on the graph, and the black
lines represent the 95% intervals. The first column corresponds to the constrained
model where the voter identification variable is constrained to be continuous; the
second to the unconstrained model where the voter identification variable is treated
as indicator variables; the third column is the Bayesian shrinkage estimate. The es-
timates in Figure 4.6 are based on models where the covariates are demeaned and
the constrained model is forced to have no intercept term. This makes comparison
across the three models clear. The constrained model forces a linear relationship on
the identification coefficient that results in a large consistent increase for each step up
the identification regime ladder. In the unconstrained model, there is little difference
at all between the four coefficients, and the relationship across the regime is nonlinear.
The Bayesian estimate looks quite similar to the unconstrained model. There are two
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Figure 4.4: Predicted probability of turnout by ID regime, education level and mi-
nority status—Ohio, 2000
important differences, however. First, the standard errors on the shrinkage estimates
are smaller, reflecting the efficiency gained by the addition of more information to
the model. Second, as the shrinkage estimate we employ is relative to a linear spec-
ification, we can clearly see that the data do not support a linear relationship (as
the individual random effects are quite large) and the constrained model is obviously
the wrong model for this problem. To gain intuition for this result, consider first
two models: one, a line (the constrained model); two, four points (the unconstrained
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Figure 4.5: Predicted probability of turnout by ID regime, education level and mi-
nority status—Ohio, 2004
model). The Bayesian shrinkage estimator essentially computes a weighted average
between the line and the point that corresponds to each ID regime. The weights are
derived from the data—both in terms of the number of observations within a cate-
gory (which is reflected in the standard errors of the constrained and unconstrained
models) and in terms of the strength of the relationship across categories.
To further explore the predictions of the Bayesian model, Figure 4.7 plots the
estimated probability of a survey respondent turning out to vote, as a function of the
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Figure 4.6: Point estimates and 95% credible intervals for the three ordinal variable
models
linear predictor for demographics, under each ID regime. The dots show the data
(y-jittered for visibility), and the heavy and light lines show the median estimate
and 20 random simulation draws from the estimated model.27 Under each regime,
the probability of turning out to vote ranges from around 0.3 to 1.0 and there is
a logistic relationship between the linear demographic predictor variable and the
probability of turnout. In this model, the logistic curve is shifted by an intercept for
each identification regime—the difference between this model and the unconstrained
model is that these intercepts are pulled toward a group linear trend. It is interesting
to note that there is no clear pattern of the effect of voter identification regime on
the probability of turning out to vote. Similarly to the model above, this may be due
to the fact that once an individual has registered to vote all other barriers are easily
met.
4.5 Discussion and future research
Clearly the Bayesian model presented here is the better choice for modeling the ordi-
nality of the voter identification variable, as it exploits the information from both an
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Figure 4.7: Estimated probability of voting by by ID regime
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additive and a linear structure. It is relatively certain, however, that the modeling of
the nationwide election trends and state-implementation is specified correctly in the
first model only. The next step in this research agenda is to combine the Bayesian
model here with a proper model of the implementation of voter ID and its effects
on subpopulations. First, interaction terms between the voter identification variable
and the interesting covariates would be included into the model. The next step in the
research would be to allow for unobserved effects on turnout at the state level and
yearly shocks, by allowing for a random intercept term that is shared by respondents
in a given (state, year) pair. As it may also be the case that a voter identification
requirement is implemented differently across the states the model will include a
random coefficient on voter identification that varies by state. Then the model even-
tually would include a voter identification group mean and individual indentification
level intercepts, in addition to a state group level mean for the voter identification
levels, and state, year, and state*year random intercepts. Another benefit to using
the Bayesian framework, which could be exploited, would be to impute the missing
responses in the survey data simultaneously with the model estimation. In addition,
the level of parsing in the identification variable could be greatly relaxed. Though
seemingly overcomplex, this model is, I believe, the correct way to model the problem.
Given the large availability of data and the computational convenience of Bayesian
methods and imputation methods, these extentions are the next step in the research
agenda. gamm deparse id
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4.6 Notes
20Indiana implemented photo ID requirements in 2006. The data will be available soon
and will be analyzed in future research.
21Due to computational difficulties, the combined approach is left for future re-
search.
22For an interesting non-political science example of multilevel regression with an
ordinal explanatory variable, see Gelman and Hill (Section 21.3).
23The range of acceptable proof of identification ranges across the states, but in ad-
dition to a form of government-issued photo identification, other acceptable pieces of
identification include utility bills, social security cards, student ID cards, paychecks,
and bank statements, as well as hunting and fishing licenses and gun permits. Com-
binations of the above requirements are often in place, such as requiring a voter to
both state and sign his/her name. These cases are coded at the level of requirement
that is more stringent. In this example, the case would be coded as a signature re-
quirement. Most states in 2004 require first-time voters who registered by mail to
present identification (per HAVA requirements), but for this analysis we coded states
based on the requirements for all voters. In addition, four states require a photo
identification card of some sort, but are coded as merely a general identification card
because the classification of photo IDs is quite broad. For instance, Florida allowed
any type of photo identification, including student IDs and Sam’s Club cards; South
Carolina required photo identification only if the freely provided voter registration
card was not presented.
24Alaska and Hawaii both required government-issued identification cards in 2000
and 2004.
25The major next step in the research is utilizing C++ coding to greatly speed
computation time and increasing the size of the sample to include the entire relevant
60
CPS data for both years.
26See Gelman et al. (2004) pp. 277-278 for a discussion of the appropriate number
of draws.
27See Gelman and Hill (2007) for R code to make these graphs.
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Appendix A
Tables for Chapter 2
Package Name Developer Description
URL
lmer{Matrix} Pinheiro and Bates Fit (Generalized) Linear
Mixed-Effects Models in R
http://rweb.stat.umn.edu/R/library/Matrix/html/lmer.html
Match Abadie et al. Matching Estimators for Average Treatment
Effects in STATA and Matlab
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/∼imbens/estimators.shtml
Matching Sekhon, Jasjeet S. Algorithms and Software for Multivariate
and Propensity Score Matching with Balance
Optimization via Genetic Search in R
http://sekhon.berkeley.edu/matching
MatchIt Ho et al. Nonparametric Preprocessing for
Parametric Causal Inference in R
http://gking.harvard.edu/matchit
optmatch Hansen, Ben B. Flexible, Optimal Matching
Observational Studies in R
http://www.stat.lsa.umich.edu/∼bbh/optmatch.html
Table A.1: Useful Software for Implementing Various Causal Inference Techniques
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State Name Counties 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 Total
Alabama 67 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alaska 40 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 15 15 15 15 15 15 75
Arkansas 75 0 0 0 27 0 27
California 58 57 58 58 58 58 289
Colorado 63 62 63 63 0 62 250
Connecticut 8 8 8 8 8 6 38
D.C. 1 1 1 1 1 1 5
Delaware 3 3 3 0 0 0 6
Florida 67 0 66 66 67 67 266
Georgia 159 0 0 154 159 159 472
Hawaii 5 4 4 4 4 4 20
Idaho 44 44 44 43 44 44 219
Illinois 102 102 101 102 102 91 498
Indiana 92 90 86 89 83 71 419
Iowa 99 0 82 98 99 99 378
Kansas 105 0 82 79 94 0 255
Kentucky 120 116 115 112 107 96 546
Louisiana 64 0 55 64 62 0 181
Maine 16 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maryland 24 23 23 24 24 20 114
Massachusetts 14 0 0 0 0 0 0
Michigan 83 19 20 20 29 53 141
Minnesota 87 56 76 78 79 0 289
Mississippi 82 0 60 2 3 0 65
Missouri 115 0 0 0 113 0 113
Montana 57 54 55 56 51 56 272
Nebraska 93 93 93 91 91 93 461
Nevada 17 17 17 16 17 17 84
New Hampshire 10 7 7 6 0 0 20
New Jersey 21 15 17 19 21 20 92
New Mexico 33 27 28 31 33 33 152
New York 62 61 61 61 62 62 307
North Carolina 100 0 25 32 29 97 183
North Dakota 53 53 53 53 53 53 265
Ohio 88 88 88 88 88 88 440
Oklahoma 77 76 77 0 7 0 160
Oregon 36 29 36 36 36 36 173
Pennsylvania 69 0 0 0 1 0 1
Rhode Island 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Carolina 46 45 39 43 45 0 172
South Dakota 66 0 0 62 65 66 193
Tennessee 95 0 11 11 10 91 123
Texas 254 0 0 0 145 0 145
Utah 29 29 29 29 29 27 143
Vermont 14 8 0 8 0 0 16
Virginia 135 0 0 0 133 132 265
Washington 39 39 38 39 37 38 191
West Virginia 55 55 0 55 0 54 164
Wisconsin 72 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wyoming 23 19 20 21 22 23 105
Total 1,315 1,656 1,837 2,153 1,832 8793
Table A.2: States Included in the Residual Vote Rate Analysis
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Percent of Counties Using Technology
Machine Type 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Punch Card 25.0% 24.3% 22.5% 20.9% 9.7%
Lever Machine 29.3% 27% 18.5% 14.8% 7.9%
Paper 32.7% 22.5% 15.1% 8.8% 10.7%
Optical Scan 5.3% 18% 30.7% 41.2% 49.9%
Electronic 1.9% 3.5% 8.7% 11.5% 19.0%
Mixed 5.8% 4.7% 4.5% 2.8% 2.8%
Table A.3: Usage of Voting Equipment in the 1988-2004 Presidential Elections, by
Percent of Counties
Percent of Population Using Technology
Machine Type 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Punch Card 43.1% 41.5% 37.4% 36.2% 10.6%
Lever Machine 32.8% 29.7% 21.6% 16.2% 13.0%
Paper 6.1% 3.2% 1.8% 0.5% 0.7%
Optical Scan 7.0% 13.9% 21.6% 30.7% 40.0%
Electronic 3.1% 4.3% 11.3% 12.3% 30.4%
Mixed 7.9% 7.4% 6.3% 4.1% 5.3%
Table A.4: Usage of Voting Equipment in the 1988-2004 Presidential Elections, by
Percent of Population
Counties Voters
Machine Type Mean 1st Median 3rd Mean 1st Median 3rd N
(Std. Dev.) Quartile Quartile (Std. Dev.) Quartile Quartile
Punch Card 2.9% 1.8% 2.4% 3.4% 2.5% 1.7% 2.3% 2.8% 2355
(2.1%) (1.5%)
Lever Machine 1.9% 0.8% 1.3% 2.3% 1.7% 0.8% 1.2% 1.8% 1519
(1.8%) (1.7%)
Paper 2.4% 1.3% 1.9% 2.9% 2.2% 1.1% 1.8% 2.6% 1301
(2.2%) (2.2%)
Optical Scan 2.1% 0.8% 1.4% 2.4% 1.5% 0.6% 1.0% 1.8% 2550
(2.7%) (2.0%)
Electronic 2.4% 1.1% 2.0% 3.2% 1.6% 0.5% 1.1% 2.1% 916
(2.6%) (2.6%)
Total 2.4% 1.1% 1.8% 2.9% 2.0% 0.9% 1.6% 2.5% 8641
(2.3%) (1.9%)
Table A.5: Residual Vote by Machine Type in U.S. Counties, 1988-2004 Presidential
Elections
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Counties Voters
Machine Type 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Punch Card 3.5% 2.7% 3.1% 2.6% 2.0% 3.0% 2.2% 2.5% 2.6% 1.6%
Lever Machine 1.8% 1.7% 2.2% 2.2% 1.1% 2.0% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 0.9%
Paper 2.7% 1.9% 2.6% 2.2% 2.2% 2.5% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 2.1%
Optical Scan 3.1% 3.1% 2.4% 2.1% 1.4% 2.6% 2.4% 1.7% 1.3% 1.1%
Electronic 3.6% 3.8% 3.3% 2.4% 1.6% 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 1.8% 1.0%
Total 2.9% 2.4% 2.7% 2.3% 1.6% 2.6% 2.1% 2.3% 1.9% 1.1%
Table A.6: Average Residual Vote by Machine Type and Year in U.S. Counties,
1988-2004 Presidential Elections
log(F(Residual Vote Rate))
Period ÂTE
1988-1992 13.9%
(16)
1992-1996 -28.3%
(5.7)
1996-2000 -43.0%
(3.4)
2000-2004 -23.8%
(4.6)
Table A.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Estimated percentage change in resid-
ual votes for an average county switching from punch cards to optical scan machines
in the specified time period
Coefficients and standard errors are transformed in order to interpret the difference as a percentage
change in residual votes. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses.
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Control: Punch Cards
ÂTE
Fixed Effects Matching
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Difference in Means Eqn. (1) Eqn. (2)
Paper Ballots -33.7% -48.9% -31.0% -31.0% -36.9%
(2.7) (3.1) (2.1) (2.1) (8.8)
Lever Machines -30.2% -31.6% -32.3% -23.7% -8.5%
(1.4) (2.1) (1.4) (1.5) (21.6)
Optical Scan -21.3% -24.4% -37.5% -26.7% -42.9%
(0.8) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5) (2.3)
Electronic -25.9% -30.3% -41.1% -23.7% -20.0%
(1.5) (2.1) (1.8) (3.1) (5.6)
Table A.8: Fixed Effects and Matching Estimates: Estimated percentage change
in residual votes for an average county switching from punch cards to treatment
technology
Coefficients and standard errors are transformed in order to interpret the difference as a percentage
change in residual votes. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses.
Control: Punch Cards
ÂTE
FE Matching: Means Matching: FE
Central Count OS -8.7% 5.0% -12.4%
(4.6) (5.2) (5.3)
Precinct Count OS -19.8% -36.3% -5.6%
(3.2) (3.2) (11.3)
Electronic DRE 5.0% -19.1% -23.9%
(5.2) (4.9) (5.3)
Electronic TS -28.9% -58.0% -
(3.6) (9.5) (-)
Table A.9: Fixed Effects and Matching Estimates: Estimated percentage change
in residual votes for an average county switching from punch cards to treatment
technology, 2004
Coefficients and standard errors are transformed in order to interpret the difference as a percentage
change in residual votes. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses.
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Independent Variable log(F(Residual Vote Rate))
(1) (2)
Punch Cards - -
- -
Paper Ballots -0.41 -0.67
(0.04) (0.06)
Lever Machines -0.36 -0.38
(0.02) (0.03)
Optical Scan -0.24 -0.28
(0.01) (0.02)
Electronic -0.30 -0.36
(0.02) (0.03)
Gov or Sen on ballot -0.01 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Shift in Voting Tech. -0.08 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02)
log(Turnout) -0.02 -0.33
(0.01) (0.05)
% Black 0.01 -
(0.001) -
% Hispanic 0.01 -
(0.001) -
% Other Origin 0.01 -
(0.001) -
% aged 18-24 -0.01 -
(0.002) -
% 65 and older 0.01 -
(0.002) -
Median Income -0.14 -
in 10,000’s (0.03) -
(Median Income)2 0.004 -
in 10,000’s (0.003) -
Constant -3.0 0.38
- (0.09) (0.56)
Observations 8793 8793
R-squared 0.48 0.66
Fixed Effect: State & Year County & Year
(not shown)
Number of categories 45 2646
F test F(44, 8730) F(2645, 6136)
= 57.8 = 2.94
(p < .0001) (p < .0001)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A.10: Residual Vote Multivariate Estimation, 1988-2004 Presidential Elections
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Appendix B
Tables for Chapter 3
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Before Matching Matching - Specification 1 Matching - Specification 2
Year 1904
vi,t−1
Mean 0.101 0.040 0.018
Median 0.098 0.024 0.013
Max 0.287 0.134 0.099
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.054 0.067 0.022
Median 0.054 0.067 0.022
Max 0.108 0.134 0.043
Pit
Mean 0.112 0.000 0.002
Median 0.112 0.000 0.002
Max 0.224 0.000 0.003
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.042 0.041 0.082
Median 0.013 0.014 0.010
Max 0.114 0.110 0.235
Year 1906
vi,t−1
Mean 0.073 0.045 0.041
Median 0.077 0.039 0.039
Max 0.153 0.142 0.104
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.046 0.037 0.021
Median 0.046 0.037 0.021
Max 0.091 0.074 0.042
Pit
Mean 0.066 0.031 0.023
Median 0.066 0.031 0.023
Max 0.132 0.061 0.045
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.042 0.067 0.044
Median 0.059 0.087 0.061
Max 0.067 0.113 0.071
Year 1908
vi,t−1
Mean 0.029 0.032 0.041
Median 0.027 0.026 0.036
Max 0.090 0.125 0.143
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.034 0.035 0.018
Median 0.034 0.035 0.018
Max 0.068 0.071 0.036
Pit
Mean 0.044 0.024 0.049
Median 0.044 0.024 0.049
Max 0.087 0.048 0.097
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.040 0.050 0.035
Median 0.019 0.074 0.006
Max 0.102 0.077 0.097
Year 1910
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vi,t−1
Mean 0.028 0.020 0.017
Median 0.022 0.017 0.013
Max 0.104 0.067 0.059
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.012 0.002 0.002
Median 0.012 0.002 0.002
Max 0.024 0.003 0.003
Pit
Mean 0.043 0.002 0.000
Median 0.043 0.002 0.000
Max 0.086 0.003 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.018 0.009 0.013
Median 0.015 0.007 0.003
Max 0.039 0.020 0.036
Year 1914
vi,t−1
Mean 0.038 0.016 0.013
Median 0.029 0.015 0.011
Max 0.157 0.069 0.059
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.024 0.010 0.026
Median 0.024 0.010 0.026
Max 0.047 0.019 0.051
Pit
Mean 0.024 0.010 0.002
Median 0.024 0.010 0.002
Max 0.049 0.019 0.004
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.025 0.024 0.034
Median 0.015 0.012 0.022
Max 0.059 0.062 0.081
Year 1916
vi,t−1
Mean 0.057 0.040 0.029
Median 0.057 0.032 0.019
Max 0.143 0.131 0.095
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.073 0.011 0.000
Median 0.073 0.011 0.000
Max 0.145 0.022 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.024 0.008 0.000
Median 0.024 0.008 0.000
Max 0.049 0.016 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.091 0.019 0.019
Median 0.126 0.006 0.022
Max 0.148 0.051 0.035
Year 1918
vi,t−1
Mean 0.025 0.035 0.019
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Median 0.024 0.035 0.014
Max 0.075 0.095 0.069
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.014 0.003 0.024
Median 0.014 0.003 0.024
Max 0.028 0.006 0.048
Pit
Mean 0.000 0.017 0.031
Median 0.000 0.017 0.031
Max 0.000 0.035 0.062
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.008 0.004 0.050
Median 0.005 0.006 0.069
Max 0.019 0.006 0.080
Year 1920
vi,t−1
Mean 0.107 0.022 0.015
Median 0.077 0.011 0.011
Max 0.294 0.115 0.096
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.084 0.026 0.028
Median 0.084 0.026 0.028
Max 0.169 0.052 0.056
Pit
Mean 0.126 0.000 0.000
Median 0.126 0.000 0.000
Max 0.252 0.000 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.095 0.049 0.051
Median 0.107 0.029 0.027
Max 0.178 0.117 0.128
Year 1924
vi,t−1
Mean 0.069 0.024 0.025
Median 0.045 0.020 0.023
Max 0.209 0.074 0.066
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.052 0.018 0.008
Median 0.052 0.018 0.008
Max 0.103 0.037 0.017
Pit
Mean 0.100 0.013 0.013
Median 0.100 0.013 0.013
Max 0.200 0.027 0.026
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.076 0.023 0.042
Median 0.097 0.017 0.043
Max 0.132 0.054 0.083
Year 1926
vi,t−1
Mean 0.039 0.037 0.036
Median 0.035 0.030 0.023
Max 0.113 0.112 0.119
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Pi,t−1
Mean 0.035 0.026 0.044
Median 0.035 0.026 0.044
Max 0.070 0.053 0.087
Pit
Mean 0.005 0.025 0.039
Median 0.005 0.025 0.039
Max 0.010 0.050 0.077
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.082 0.070 0.083
Median 0.056 0.073 0.074
Max 0.190 0.139 0.174
Year 1928
vi,t−1
Mean 0.037 0.028 0.033
Median 0.030 0.025 0.032
Max 0.116 0.076 0.095
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.009 0.000 0.009
Median 0.009 0.000 0.009
Max 0.018 0.000 0.019
Pit
Mean 0.016 0.003 0.013
Median 0.016 0.003 0.013
Max 0.033 0.006 0.025
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.069 0.045 0.052
Median 0.092 0.050 0.032
Max 0.115 0.085 0.123
Year 1930
vi,t−1
Mean 0.048 0.020 0.018
Median 0.034 0.017 0.013
Max 0.169 0.080 0.070
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.043 0.003 0.010
Median 0.043 0.003 0.010
Max 0.085 0.007 0.020
Pit
Mean 0.047 0.000 0.000
Median 0.047 0.000 0.000
Max 0.093 0.000 0.000
Mean 0.056 0.019 0.021
Median 0.076 0.027 0.030
Max 0.092 0.030 0.033
Year 1934
vi,t−1
Mean 0.128 0.046 0.036
Median 0.128 0.038 0.030
Max 0.232 0.138 0.114
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.098 0.004 0.008
Median 0.098 0.004 0.008
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Max 0.196 0.008 0.015
Pit
Mean 0.037 0.021 0.021
Median 0.037 0.021 0.021
Max 0.074 0.042 0.042
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.123 0.018 0.024
Median 0.141 0.023 0.019
Max 0.229 0.031 0.053
Year 1936
vi,t−1
Mean 0.111 0.026 0.015
Median 0.114 0.020 0.013
Max 0.229 0.091 0.054
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.079 0.037 0.000
Median 0.079 0.037 0.000
Max 0.158 0.074 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.084 0.007 0.000
Median 0.084 0.007 0.000
Max 0.168 0.013 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.110 0.027 0.040
Median 0.164 0.034 0.032
Max 0.165 0.047 0.088
Year 1938
vi,t−1
Mean 0.031 0.032 0.022
Median 0.024 0.025 0.016
Max 0.106 0.115 0.073
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.023 0.001 0.000
Median 0.023 0.001 0.000
Max 0.046 0.002 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.006 0.005 0.000
Median 0.006 0.005 0.000
Max 0.013 0.011 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.068 0.001 0.048
Median 0.083 0.000 0.039
Max 0.120 0.002 0.104
Year 1940
vi,t−1
Mean 0.038 0.021 0.012
Median 0.034 0.018 0.008
Max 0.119 0.090 0.051
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.025 0.005 0.000
Median 0.025 0.005 0.000
Max 0.050 0.009 0.000
Pit
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Mean 0.023 0.003 0.000
Median 0.023 0.003 0.000
Max 0.046 0.007 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.007 0.006 0.010
Median 0.005 0.009 0.011
Max 0.017 0.009 0.020
Year 1944
vi,t−1
Mean 0.115 0.025 0.018
Median 0.101 0.018 0.011
Max 0.281 0.112 0.103
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.031 0.000 0.000
Median 0.031 0.000 0.000
Max 0.062 0.000 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.122 0.000 0.000
Median 0.122 0.000 0.000
Max 0.244 0.000 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.047 0.003 0.045
Median 0.022 0.003 0.000
Max 0.120 0.008 0.135
Year 1946
vi,t−1
Mean 0.100 0.025 0.015
Median 0.101 0.021 0.013
Max 0.195 0.097 0.051
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.066 0.009 0.000
Median 0.066 0.009 0.000
Max 0.132 0.018 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.051 0.015 0.009
Median 0.051 0.015 0.009
Max 0.102 0.029 0.017
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.084 0.010 0.026
Median 0.064 0.012 0.006
Max 0.189 0.018 0.071
Year 1948
vi,t−1
Mean 0.094 0.053 0.026
Median 0.099 0.056 0.023
Max 0.219 0.119 0.088
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.020 0.038 0.018
Median 0.020 0.038 0.018
Max 0.039 0.076 0.036
Pit
Mean 0.042 0.050 0.018
Median 0.042 0.050 0.018
74
Max 0.084 0.099 0.036
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.039 0.026 0.053
Median 0.016 0.003 0.071
Max 0.101 0.076 0.088
Year 1950
vi,t−1
Mean 0.085 0.033 0.057
Median 0.078 0.026 0.053
Max 0.190 0.129 0.167
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.018 0.028 0.048
Median 0.018 0.028 0.048
Max 0.036 0.056 0.097
Pit
Mean 0.066 0.015 0.050
Median 0.066 0.015 0.050
Max 0.133 0.029 0.100
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.046 0.020 0.040
Median 0.063 0.023 0.059
Max 0.076 0.035 0.062
Year 1954
vi,t−1
Mean 0.036 0.036 0.074
Median 0.033 0.028 0.083
Max 0.104 0.147 0.158
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.009 0.003 0.040
Median 0.009 0.003 0.040
Max 0.018 0.007 0.079
Pit
Mean 0.008 0.013 0.021
Median 0.008 0.013 0.021
Max 0.016 0.026 0.043
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.035 0.005 0.031
Median 0.045 0.007 0.017
Max 0.059 0.010 0.076
Year 1956
vi,t−1
Mean 0.077 0.055 0.053
Median 0.067 0.056 0.055
Max 0.200 0.157 0.143
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.032 0.049 0.053
Median 0.032 0.049 0.053
Max 0.063 0.099 0.106
Pit
Mean 0.002 0.022 0.026
Median 0.002 0.022 0.026
Max 0.004 0.043 0.052
Ii,t−1
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Mean 0.035 0.063 0.062
Median 0.022 0.071 0.088
Max 0.083 0.117 0.097
Year 1958
vi,t−1
Mean 0.076 0.030 0.023
Median 0.070 0.021 0.021
Max 0.233 0.115 0.066
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.105 0.000 0.001
Median 0.105 0.000 0.001
Max 0.210 0.000 0.003
Pit
Mean 0.096 0.018 0.010
Median 0.096 0.018 0.010
Max 0.192 0.036 0.021
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.114 0.013 0.019
Median 0.166 0.003 0.018
Max 0.178 0.036 0.039
Year 1960
vi,t−1
Mean 0.077 0.033 0.029
Median 0.078 0.024 0.021
Max 0.162 0.149 0.138
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.014 0.015 0.009
Median 0.014 0.015 0.009
Max 0.027 0.030 0.018
Pit
Mean 0.079 0.024 0.018
Median 0.079 0.024 0.018
Max 0.159 0.049 0.036
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.037 0.034 0.035
Median 0.026 0.030 0.021
Max 0.086 0.070 0.084
Year 1964
vi,t−1
Mean 0.067 0.073 0.092
Median 0.060 0.078 0.092
Max 0.185 0.169 0.211
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.028 0.019 0.048
Median 0.028 0.019 0.048
Max 0.055 0.039 0.095
Pit
Mean 0.039 0.044 0.072
Median 0.039 0.044 0.072
Max 0.079 0.088 0.145
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.012 0.032 0.093
Median 0.003 0.006 0.125
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Max 0.033 0.091 0.155
Year 1966
vi,t−1
Mean 0.040 0.054 0.056
Median 0.035 0.046 0.051
Max 0.110 0.189 0.179
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.068 0.041 0.038
Median 0.068 0.041 0.038
Max 0.136 0.082 0.077
Pit
Mean 0.009 0.051 0.038
Median 0.009 0.051 0.038
Max 0.018 0.102 0.077
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.056 0.056 0.049
Median 0.082 0.036 0.031
Max 0.087 0.133 0.117
Year 1968
vi,t−1
Mean 0.110 0.143 0.088
Median 0.082 0.151 0.077
Max 0.350 0.297 0.276
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.034 0.109 0.092
Median 0.034 0.109 0.092
Max 0.068 0.219 0.184
Pit
Mean 0.001 0.125 0.059
Median 0.001 0.125 0.059
Max 0.002 0.250 0.117
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.077 0.104 0.054
Median 0.106 0.130 0.010
Max 0.126 0.182 0.153
Year 1970
vi,t−1
Mean 0.071 0.032 0.030
Median 0.065 0.026 0.023
Max 0.173 0.151 0.116
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.012 0.000 0.011
Median 0.012 0.000 0.011
Max 0.024 0.000 0.023
Pit
Mean 0.040 0.005 0.003
Median 0.040 0.005 0.003
Max 0.080 0.010 0.006
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.007 0.013 0.025
Median 0.009 0.003 0.016
Max 0.013 0.035 0.058
Year 1974
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vi,t−1
Mean 0.031 0.045 0.048
Median 0.028 0.044 0.041
Max 0.109 0.126 0.137
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.028 0.005 0.036
Median 0.028 0.005 0.036
Max 0.056 0.010 0.072
Pit
Mean 0.004 0.036 0.014
Median 0.004 0.036 0.014
Max 0.007 0.072 0.027
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.039 0.050 0.052
Median 0.004 0.061 0.010
Max 0.113 0.089 0.147
Year 1976
vi,t−1
Mean 0.041 0.041 0.036
Median 0.025 0.028 0.031
Max 0.158 0.131 0.128
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.040 0.006 0.004
Median 0.040 0.006 0.004
Max 0.079 0.011 0.008
Pit
Mean 0.006 0.030 0.028
Median 0.006 0.030 0.028
Max 0.011 0.060 0.056
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.055 0.051 0.058
Median 0.003 0.063 0.067
Max 0.162 0.091 0.108
Year 1978
vi,t−1
Mean 0.089 0.033 0.026
Median 0.092 0.032 0.017
Max 0.164 0.095 0.089
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.032 0.004 0.014
Median 0.032 0.004 0.014
Max 0.065 0.009 0.029
Pit
Mean 0.032 0.006 0.023
Median 0.032 0.006 0.023
Max 0.065 0.011 0.046
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.038 0.016 0.011
Median 0.022 0.023 0.000
Max 0.091 0.026 0.034
Year 1980
vi,t−1
Mean 0.059 0.026 0.015
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Median 0.057 0.022 0.011
Max 0.164 0.084 0.055
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.069 0.004 0.000
Median 0.069 0.004 0.000
Max 0.137 0.008 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.030 0.027 0.021
Median 0.030 0.027 0.021
Max 0.061 0.054 0.042
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.096 0.043 0.039
Median 0.086 0.059 0.054
Max 0.201 0.070 0.063
Year 1984
vi,t−1
Mean 0.068 0.025 0.024
Median 0.047 0.020 0.020
Max 0.210 0.081 0.086
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.074 0.006 0.000
Median 0.074 0.006 0.000
Max 0.148 0.013 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.040 0.013 0.013
Median 0.040 0.013 0.013
Max 0.080 0.026 0.026
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.111 0.010 0.017
Median 0.129 0.009 0.006
Max 0.204 0.022 0.044
Year 1986
vi,t−1
Mean 0.101 0.022 0.020
Median 0.115 0.016 0.013
Max 0.248 0.089 0.084
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.109 0.000 0.000
Median 0.109 0.000 0.000
Max 0.218 0.000 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.077 0.030 0.028
Median 0.077 0.030 0.028
Max 0.155 0.060 0.055
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.119 0.019 0.015
Median 0.107 0.006 0.019
Max 0.250 0.051 0.026
Year 1988
vi,t−1
Mean 0.097 0.054 0.053
Median 0.069 0.028 0.025
Max 0.283 0.271 0.275
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Pi,t−1
Mean 0.099 0.011 0.009
Median 0.099 0.011 0.009
Max 0.198 0.022 0.019
Pit
Mean 0.113 0.000 0.000
Median 0.113 0.000 0.000
Max 0.226 0.000 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.104 0.022 0.032
Median 0.153 0.006 0.035
Max 0.160 0.059 0.060
Year 1990
vi,t−1
Mean 0.139 0.033 0.021
Median 0.141 0.025 0.014
Max 0.298 0.103 0.133
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.113 0.019 0.006
Median 0.113 0.019 0.006
Max 0.227 0.038 0.011
Pit
Mean 0.121 0.011 0.000
Median 0.121 0.011 0.000
Max 0.242 0.022 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.157 0.020 0.020
Median 0.201 0.000 0.023
Max 0.272 0.060 0.037
Year 1994
vi,t−1
Mean 0.083 0.065 0.043
Median 0.065 0.068 0.041
Max 0.210 0.147 0.105
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.022 0.068 0.055
Median 0.022 0.068 0.055
Max 0.043 0.136 0.111
Pit
Mean 0.016 0.055 0.029
Median 0.016 0.055 0.029
Max 0.033 0.109 0.058
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.054 0.056 0.043
Median 0.021 0.000 0.044
Max 0.141 0.168 0.085
Year 1996
vi,t−1
Mean 0.032 0.036 0.026
Median 0.024 0.030 0.019
Max 0.128 0.141 0.132
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.009 0.006 0.000
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Median 0.009 0.006 0.000
Max 0.018 0.011 0.000
Pit
Mean 0.049 0.011 0.005
Median 0.049 0.011 0.005
Max 0.097 0.022 0.011
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.036 0.016 0.037
Median 0.053 0.019 0.027
Max 0.055 0.028 0.085
Year 1998
vi,t−1
Mean 0.034 0.027 0.057
Median 0.030 0.024 0.060
Max 0.103 0.096 0.129
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.025 0.028 0.032
Median 0.025 0.028 0.032
Max 0.051 0.057 0.063
Pit
Mean 0.004 0.045 0.062
Median 0.004 0.045 0.062
Max 0.008 0.090 0.124
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.051 0.026 0.033
Median 0.026 0.012 0.011
Max 0.128 0.066 0.086
Year 2000
vi,t−1
Mean 0.091 0.043 0.032
Median 0.079 0.043 0.026
Max 0.272 0.112 0.114
Pi,t−1
Mean 0.103 0.003 0.011
Median 0.103 0.003 0.011
Max 0.207 0.007 0.023
Pit
Mean 0.111 0.002 0.000
Median 0.111 0.002 0.000
Max 0.221 0.003 0.000
Ii,t−1
Mean 0.139 0.035 0.036
Median 0.152 0.046 0.036
Max 0.265 0.059 0.072
Table B.1: Differences in QQPlots Before and After Matching,
Incumbency Advantage
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Education: Some HS HS Grad Some College College Grad Total
Male 4.7 13.4 13.2 14.6 45.9
Female 5.4 16.9 17.0 14.8 54.1
Total 10.05 30.25 30.25 29.45 100
Age: 18–24 25–40 41–64 65 and older Total
Male 3.8 13.2 20.8 8.1 45.9
Female 4.8 15.7 23.3 10.3 54.1
Total 8.6 28.9 44.1 18.4 100
Race: White Non-White Total
Male 38.5 7.5 46.0
Female 43.7 10.3 54.0
Total 82.2 17.8 100
Income: Less than $25,000 $25,000–$49,999 $50,000–$74,999 More than $75,000 Total
Male 8.9 13.9 10.4 12.8 46.0
Female 14.2 16.2 10.9 12.7 54.0
Total 23.1 30.1 21.3 25.5 100
These percentages are based on the 49,897 individuals with complete responses to the subset of questions
of interest that were asked on the CPS.
Table C.1: Contingency Tables for Selected Characteristics, 2000 CPS
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Education: Some HS HS Grad Some College College Grad Total
Male 4.1 13.4 13.5 15.3 46.3
Female 4.7 15.9 17.4 15.7 53.7
Total 8.8 29.3 30.9 31.0 100
Age: 18–24 25–40 41–64 65 and older Total
Male 4.3 12.1 22.0 7.9 46.3
Female 4.9 14.3 24.5 10.0 53.7
Total 9.2 26.4 46.5 17.9 100
Race: White Non-White Total
Male 38.6 7.8 46.4
Female 43.3 10.3 53.6
Total 81.9 18.1 100
Income: Less than $25,000 $25,000–$49,999 $50,000–$74,999 More than $75,000 Total
Male 7.9 12.7 10.8 14.9 46.3
Female 12.6 14.8 11.4 14.9 53.7
Total 20.5 27.5 22.2 29.8 100
These percentages are based on the 60,431 individuals with complete responses to the subset of questions
of interest that were asked on the CPS.
Table C.2: Contingency Tables for Selected Characteristics, 2004 CPS
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Pooled 2000 2004
South -0.19 -0.14 -0.18
(0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
Gender 0.11 0.09 0.13
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Non-White -0.08 -0.18 0.008
(0.006) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.07 0.46 0.62
(0.02) (0.002) (0.003)
Education2 0.08 0.06 0.11
(0.0009) (0.0002) (0.002)
Age 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.00007) (0.000005) (0.000005)
Age2 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00001
(0.000000007) (0.00000001) (0.00000002)
Income 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.000008) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Voter ID -0.36 0.03 -0.014
(0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Education * Voter ID 0.12 0.005 -0.02
(0.003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Education2 * Voter ID -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age * Voter ID 0.008 0.002 0.001
(0.000007) (0.0000006) (0.0000005)
Age2 * Voter ID 0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00008
(0.0000000008) (0.000000002) (0.000000002)
Non-White * Voter ID 0.06 0.11 0.02
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -1.16 2.09 2.45
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of Observations 110,328 49,897 60431
Table C.3: Logit Coefficients for Model of Voter Turnout as a Function of Voter
Identification Regime
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Note that the education, age and income variables
are centered at their means in the 2000 and 2004 regressions.
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